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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Free trade in goods and services within the Community of Nine has been 
largely achieved, although significant non-tariff barriers remain in 
both the industrial and the agricultural fields. Monetary union, on 
which much has been written, is — for reasons given by the Marjolin 
Committee(l) - a long way off and will probably have to await major 
developments in the political, monetary and fiscal fields. This report 
examines the third main element in economic union, largely neglected so 
far, namely the role of public finance, which we take to embrace not 
only taxation and public expenditure, but also the many regulatory, co-
ordinating and non-budgetary activities in the economic field in exist-
ing economic unions. 
A major part of our work has been a detailed and quantitative study of 
public finance in five existing federations (Federal Republic of Germany, 
U.S.A., Canada, Australia, Switzerland) and three unitary states (France, 
Italy and the U.K.) - eight countries in all - and in particular the 
financial relationships between different levels of government and the 
economic effects of public finance on geographical regions within the 
countries. We have also studied a good deal of the voluminous theoreti-
cal literature on "fiscal federalism". The main purpose has been to see 
what light these studies throw on future developments in the public 
finances of the European Community. 
It is most unlikely that the Community will be anything like so fully 
integrated in the field of public finance for many years to come as the 
existing economic unions we have studied. Nevertheless, we believe that 
our analysis helps to throw light on the ways in which the public finance 
activities of the Community might be expanded and improved during, say, 
the next decade. We do not make any definite recommendations (although 
we describe a possible package, with options, to help focus discussion); 
but we hope that the orders of magnitude we present will help to put the 
political debate on these matters in perspective, that our analysis will 
help those who have to decide the direction in which Community expendi-
tures (and revenues) might be extended, and that it will also help those 
who have to determine which of the many possible techniques would be most 
appropriate: our analysis of other countries provides a rich treasure 
house of experience - including mistakes to be avoided. 
(ï) Report of the Study Group "Economic and Monetary Union 1980". 
Brussels, March 1975· -12-
Main points from study of eight countries and existing Community 
The most relevant orders of magnitude and other facts are as follows: 
1. Public expenditure by members of the Community in 1975 was about 
45 % of the gross product of the area as a whole (this is 
the weighted average for the individual states). Expenditure by 
all Community Institutions is 0.7 % (10 billion units of account 
in 1977). 
2. Although the statistical problems are considerable, it can be said 
with a fair degree of certainty that per capita incomes are in 
general at least as unequal between the Nine members of the Commu-
nity (and between the 72 regions we have distinguished in the 
Community) as they are on average between the various regions of 
the countries we have studied, even before allowing for the equal-
ising effects of public expenditure and taxation. 
3· These reduce regional inequalities in per capita income by, on av-
erage, about 40 % in the countries studied (by more in Australia 
and France, by less in the U.S.A. and Germany). The redistributive 
power between member states of the Community's finances, by compari-
son, is - not surprisingly - very small indeed (1 %); partly because 
the Community budget is relatively so small, partly because the 
expenditures and revenues of the Community have a weak geographical 
redistributive power per unit of account. 
4· The redistribution through public finance between regions in the 
countries studied tends to be reflected to a large extent (though 
not, of course, precisely because other factors are involved) in 
corresponding deficits in the balances of payments on current account 
of the poorer regions, with corresponding surpluses in the richer 
regions. These deficits and surpluses are of a continuing nature. 
Net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % of regional 
product are common for both relatively rich and relatively poor 
regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net in-
flo-ws, up to around 30 % of regional product. 
5. As well as redistributing income regionally on a continuing basis, 
public finance in existing economic unions plays a major role in 
cushioning short-term and cyclical fluctuations. For example, one-
half to two-thirds of a short-term loss of primary income in a 
region due to a fall in its external sales may be automatically off-
set through lower payments of taxes and insurance contributions to 
the centre, and higher receipts of unemployment and other benefits. 
If only because the Community budget is so relatively very small 
there is no such mechanism in operation on any significant scale 
as between member countries, and this ie an important reason why in 
present circumstances monetary union is impracticable. 13 
6. The importance of the various instruments which effect inter-
regional redistribution varies. On the tax side, personal income 
tax is, in most countries, the predominant instrument. The main 
public expenditure programmes and social security systems also tend 
to have substantial redistributive effects. 
In unitary states a large part of the total redistribution between 
regions arises automatically in these ways and is in a sense "invi-
sible"; high incomes go with high tax payments and low incomes with 
high receipts of centrally provided services and transfer payments. 
(Regional policy narrowly defined is relatively unimportant). 
In federal countries intergovernmental grants and tax-sharing play 
a much more important part. These achieve relatively large redis-
tributive results with relatively small amounts of federal expendi-
ture, because the net inter—regional transfers are to a smaller 
extent than elsewhere the result of differences between large pay-
ments in opposite directions. 
7· In the federal countries, leaving aside defence and external relations 
including aid, which are always a federal responsibility, as much as 
one-half to two-thirds of civil expenditure is left in the hands of 
lower levels of government, sometimes including most expenditure on 
education, health, houses and roads, although social security is 
normally a predominantly federal responsibility. On the other hand, 
the financing of the expenditure is much more a federal responsibility 
- to the extent of one-half to four—fifths. 
8. The difference is reflected in grants from federal to lower levels 
of government; and the variety of techniques used - general purpose 
grants, specific purpose grants, matching grants, etc. - has been 
carefully analysed with a view to drawing lessons for the Community. 
9. As regards the distribution of the main taxes between levels of 
government in the federations, there are few general rules except 
that customs duties are always federal, property tax always local 
or state, and social security contributions (or social insurance) 
mostly federal, except in the United States. For personal and cor-
porate income tax, general sales tax and excises, there is a broad 
range of practices. 
Implications for the future role of public finance in the Community 
It is possible to conceive, presumably at some distant date, a Federation 
in Europe in which federal public expenditure is around 20 - 25 $ of 
gross product as in the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Germany. 14 
An earlier stage would be a federation with a much smaller federal ex-
penditure of the order of 5 - 7 % of gross product, or roughly τ£ - 10 % 
if defence were included. An essential characteristic of such a feder-
ation would be that the supply of social and welfare services would 
nearly all remain at the national level. Such an arrangement could 
provide sufficient geographical equalisation of productivity, living 
standards and cushioning of temporary fluctuations to support a monetary 
union. But there are various degrees of confidence as to whether this 
would in practice be feasible. 
In our Report we have tended to concentrate more on what we call "pre-
federal integration", a period during which it is assumed that the 
Community's political structure is being gradually built up, partly 
with the direct election of the European Parliament. We can envisage 
public expenditure at Community level rising to around, say, 2 - 2% % 
of gross product during this period. 
In considering which expenditure functions might be carried out to a 
greater extent at Community level we have taken account, in addition 
to the experience of the eight countries studied, and political realities 
as we assume them to be, the following criteria. 
First, the case for Community involvement where this can achieve "econo-
mies of scale", including greater bargaining power vis-à-vis third 
countries. This applies mainly to external relations (where it is a 
reality in external trade; a partial reality, which might be extended, 
in aid to developing countries; a possibility in energy and political 
co-operation; not at present a possibility as regards the supply of the 
defence services, although this does not rule out ad hoc co-operation 
between individual members). There are also possible economies of scale 
in Community action on advanced technology, industrial and technical 
standards, etc. 
Secondly, there is a case for Community involvement when developments in 
one part of the Community "spill over" into other parts of it, or indeed 
all of it. Several of the external functions already referred to as 
achieving economies of scale also have major spillover effects. An im-
portant example, internal to the Community, during the "pre-federal 
integration" stage will, in our view, be Community action in the areas 
of structural and cyclical policies (regional, manpower, unemployment) 
to ensure so far as possible that the benefits of closer integration are 
seen to accrue to all, that there is growing convergence - or at least 
not widening divergence - in the economic performance and fortunes of 
member states. Those measures should make a start in reducing the in-
equalities in per capita incomes between the various parts of the area; 
the situation in the eight countries studied tends to confirm that this 
is a necessary part of economic union. -15-
Thirdly, we assume that most member governments are reluotant at the 
present time to see any significant increase in total public expenditure 
at all levels - Community, national, state and local — as a peroentage 
of gross product. This means that, besides curbing our ambitions for 
the Community, we must look for transfers of expenditure from national 
to Community levels, especially where economies of scale can be achieved; 
for savings where possible in existing Community expenditures (for example 
agriculture, which at present comprises two—thirds of the Community 
budget); for the most cost-effective methods of achieving the objectives 
described in the previous paragraph; and avoidance of regulations, harm-
onisation, etc. which are not worth-while in terms of the extra bureau-
cratic and other costs involved. 
Changes in the Community's expenditure 
In the light of these various considerations, and to provoke discussion 
by those responsible for action, we would suggest the following main 
directions in which the Community's expenditure might be changed during 
the "pre-federal integration" phase. 
(a) The Community is already, and will increasingly on present plans 
become, involved in development aid. There is scope for transfers 
from national to Community level of some 2—4 billion units of 
account. This could achieve economies of scale by reducing admin-
istrative costs for recipient and donor countries and increasing 
the value of aid received by spreading the choice of procurement 
over a wider area. 
(b) We would not see a case at this stage - though circumstances may 
change - for significant Community involvement in social and wel-
fare services, which make up well over one-half of member states' 
total public expenditure, except for unemployment and vocational 
training - see (e) (ii)—(iii) below. The Community has an interest 
in such matters as standards of teaching of European languages, 
mutual recognition of examination standards and reciprocity in 
health services and social security, but these will not involve 
large amounts of public money. 
(c) We would look for savings wherever possible, for example in agri-
culture and, less important quantitatively, through economies of 
scale in, for example, advanced technology, common political rep-
resentation in smaller third countries, etc. 
(d) In industrial sectors other than agriculture, for which Community 
intervention is established or plausible (e.g. steel, fisheries, 
energy, certain declining industries), the amount of direct budget-
ary subsidies should not tend to become large. But, not to be 
confused with budgetary expenditure, much larger sums of parallel 
loan financing, borrowed by the Community on capital markets or 
under Community guarantee, might be appropriate in some cases. 16 
(e) It is in the area of structural, cyclical, employment and regional 
policies that we see the main need for substantial expenditure at 
Community level. The purpose of these measures is mainly to help 
to reduce inter-regional differences in capital endowment and 
productivity. Our general report sets out a "menu" of six possi-
bilities. 
(i) More Community participation than at present in regional 
policy aids (employment or investment incentives, public infra-
structure, urban redevelopment). 
(ii) More Community participation than at present in labour 
market policies (including vocational training and other employ-
ment measures ). 
(iii) A Community Unemployment Fund on the lines suggested in 
the Marjolin Report under which part of the contributions of 
individuals in work would be shown as being paid to the Community 
and part of the receipts of individuals out of work as coming 
from the Community. This need not necessarily involve any increase 
in total public expenditure or contributions in the Community as 
a whole. Apart from the political attractions of bringing the 
individual citizen into direct contact with the Community, it 
would have significant redistributive effects and help to cushion 
temporary setbacks in particular member countries, thereby going 
a small part of the way towards creating a situation in which 
monetary union could be sustained. 
(iv) A limited budget equalisation scheme for extremely weak 
member states to bring their fiscal capacity up to, say, 65 % of 
the Community average and so ensure that their welfare and public 
service standards are not too far below those of the main body of 
the Community. 
(v) A system of cyclical grants to local or regional governments 
that would depend upon regional economic conditions. 
(vi) A "conjunctural convergence facility" aimed at preventing 
acute cyclical problems for weak member states leading to increas-
ing economic divergences. 
We judge that a selection from these six possibilities, or variants 
of them, involving budgetary expenditure of the order of 5 - 10 
billion units of account per annum on average could be regarded as 
beginning to be economically significant. A 10 billion unit of 
account packet could reduce inequalities in living standards between 
member states by about 10 %, compared with the average of about 40 % 
in the countries studied, and might be judged an acceptable start. 17 
Where grants are involved in the above possibilities (other than 
the suggested Unemployment Fund) they should be made as cost-
effective as possible. This could involve, for example, the \ 
of specific purpose matching grants (the Community providing a 
share of the total cost); having variable matching ratios, e.g. 
between 80 % and 20 % for poorer and richer states or regions so 
that the money went where it was most needed; and possibly the 
attachment of macro—economic performance conditions (on inflation, 
monetary policy, etc.) to some of the grants, to increase the like-
lihood that they would increase economic convergence. 
The net cost of the suggestions under (a) - (e) above, allowing 
for savings, economies of scale, and mere transfers of expenditure 
from national to Community level, as well as for the hopefully 
favourable effects on the growth and stability of the Community's 
gross product, should not increase total public expenditure in the 
Community at all levels as a proportion of real product by much 
more than a percentage point. Allowing for the transfer of expen-
diture from national to Community level, the Community budget 
might rise from 0.7 % to around 2 - 2-g- %. 
Financing 
This would, nevertheless, raise a problem of financing, because on likely 
present policies the Community will approach the limit of its existing 
financial capacity (customs duties, agricultural levies and not more than 
1 % of VAT on a common base) towards the end of the decade, and without 
assuming any new policy developments with significant budgetary impli-
cations such as we have suggested, modest as they may be. 
The Group has therefore considered what the Community's next resources 
might be. Most possible candidates are either inadequate in size or 
raise serious practical difficulties. We therefore suggest as one source 
of finance a further tranche of VAT resources on the present approximately 
neutral basis after adjustment by the "Financial Mechanism". But we also 
suggest in addition a more progressive revenue source. Drawing on prin-
ciples followed in Canada and Germany this could be a variant built onto 
the VAT system with adjustments based on a formula using a progressivity 
key such as personal income tax capacity. 
Stabilisation 
We have considered whether the Community budget could or should be used 
as an instrument for helping to stabilise short-term and cyclical fluc-
tuations in economic activity. We conclude that this would be very 
limited in the "pre-federal integration" period. With a budget of the 
order of 1 $ - 2¿- $ of gross product the budget balance wculd have to 
swing by enormous percentage fractions of this budget to have a percep-
tible macro-economic effect on activity in the Community as a whole; - 18 
and to allow this would also weaken the link in the minds of politicians 
between public expenditure and the need to pay for it over a period of 
years by taxation. In any case, some would hold that budgetary deficits 
and surpluses would have only limited effects unless they were linked 
with a coordinated Community monetary policy. 
We would, however, favour limited powers of borrowing (and repayment) to 
prevent the need for a Community budgetary policy that actually accen­
tuated cyclical movements, by forcing tax increases or expenditure cuts 
in recession years and vice versa. We would also favour specific counter­
cyclical policies under (e) (iii), (ν) and (vi) above - the Unemployment 
Fund; cyclical grants to local or regional governments; a "conjunctural 
convergence facility". 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we hope that the analysis in our Report will be of some 
assistance to those who will be debating, and taking decisions on, these 
hitherto rather neglected public finance aspects of economic union. We 
should also like to think that the detailed chapters supporting the 
general report will for a considerable time be an important work of 
reference to which will turn for guidance, and even inspiration, those 
who have to analyse, advise on, and deal with, the many problems relating 
to public finance that we believe are bound to come up quite frequently 
in the yeare ahead. 
Finally, we should like to pay tribute to the superb, original, profes­
sional work by the Secretariat which has supported our deliberations. 
To a large extent our Group has been in the nature of a Steering Committee 
of a number of highly qualified researchers, without whose expert and 
devoted work this Report could never have been produced. 19 
1. AIM OF THE REPORT, AND POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The subject of this report is the actual and potential role of .olio 
finance at the European level. We have also found it necessary to 
consider regulatory, or coordinating activities in the economic field. 
The main emphasis, however, is on public finance. This subject consti-
tutes a third major aspect of economic integration, beyond the first two 
more familiar aspects, which are free trade and monetary integration. 
At the outset, the Group's assumptions must be made explicit on two 
points; first, the geographic extent of the area in question, and second-
ly, its broad political objectives. 
As to geographic extent, the Group has taken the political framework as 
given, and has concerned itself with the Community of the Nine, with 
some of the implications of extending membership to one or more Mediter-
ranean countries. 
As regards the political objectives of the Community, the Group has 
thought it right to avoid any particular value judgement as to the degree 
of political union to be attained. It has, however, felt it useful to 
start with the status quo, and beyond that, to consider three hypotheti-
cal degrees of integration which the Community might achieve and which 
could also be considered as representing different stages on the way 
towards closer union. These may be described as: 
- pre-federal integration 
- federation with a small public sector at the Community level 
- federation with a large public sector at the Community level 
We have not pursued the distinction between federation and confederation, 
beyond noting that in a confederation the states retain greater power. 
The distinction is not so clear in the economic as it is in the political 
and legal fields. 
The status quo is characterised by a largely completed customs union, 
but one which is still distorted and buttressed by budgetary compensatory 
devices in the agricultural sector, and is fragile and incomplete in the 
industrial sector (e.g. the recent use of import deposits in Italy, 
limited effective competition in public tendering). Ambitious plans for 
monetary integration have failed and have relapsed into selective club 
arrangements (the 'snake'). Despite some divergence, rather than con-
vergence, of economic performance between the most and least prosperous 
member states, integration is nonetheless proceeding, in an uneven and 
often modest way, in quite a number of public sectoral activities through 
financing, regulation and coordination (e.g. in development aid, regional 
policy, environmental policy, industrial and commercial norms and con-
ditions of competition). Public expenditure at the Community level is 
very small - under 1 # of gross product. 20 
Pre-federai integration is assumed to consist of completing the common 
market, e.g. by the elimination of non-tariff trade barriers, other dis-
tortions to trade and freer movement of capital and labour. There would 
also be some increased public sector activities partly or wholly in sub-
stitution for the member states, and further steps towards economic and 
monetary policy intervention - falling short, however, of monetary union. 
It is assumed that the Community's political structure is being gradually 
built up, partly with the direct election of the European Parliament, and 
that this affects both its internal and its external policies. 
The Community's economic policies are assumed to include intervention in 
some industries as well as structural and redistribution policies designed 
to bring about a greater convergence of economic performance and fortunes 
between member states and regions - in the absence of which further inte-
gration of any fundamental kind would be unattainable. As regards the 
general level of economic activity, the instruments remain very largely 
in national hands, but since public expenditure at the Community level 
might rise from the present level of O.7 % to 2 - 2£ # of gross product, 
it might be possible for Community finance to play some part in stabili-
sation and growth policy. 
There is a strong contrast between this situation and that of a large 
public sector federation, like the federations already in existence. 
There, several of the major social and welfare expenditure functions 
would be in the hands of the federal government, so that it would have 
extensive direct contacts with individuals, by-passing the national 
level. Correspondingly, on the tax side, the large public sector feder-
ation implies a predominance of federal over state taxes. In existing 
federations like the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
federal public expenditure is around 20 to 25 % of GNP. The very large 
groBS inter-governmental and other inter-regional flows of funds that 
this involves perform some important equalisation and stabilisation 
funotions. While the Community might conceivably develop a public sector 
of this size, our référencée to a possible federation are based on a very 
much smaller one. 
It would, for example, be possible to perform the same equalisation and 
stabilisation functions by means of net financial transfers which would 
be smaller. We may therefore envisage a small public sector federation 
in which the supply of social and welfare services (health, education, 
social security and welfare) would essentially remain at the national 
level, while the required equalisation of public service provision 
between members would be achieved by financial transfers between them 
which would be smaller than those in existing federations. Programmes 
of federal aid to particular industries and regions could also be limited 
to selective intervention, topping up national efforts. This would make 
possible a federation with central expenditure amounting to about 5 - 7 % 
of GNP. This ceiling would be increased if defence expenditure became a 
federal responsiblity; defence expenditure on the present scale would 
add about 2£ - 3 % of GNP. 21 
A federation with these special characteristics would facilitate creation 
of a monetary union. Existing national federations enjoy such union 
internally, and its maintenance is powerfully assisted by the largely 
automatic equalising and stabilising inter—regional flows through the 
channels of federal finance. In the view of some members of the Group 
the necessary public finance underpinning for a monetary union could be 
achieved with a small Community public sector, having the special charac-
teristics that we describe. Other members, while agreeing that in these 
circumstances monetary union would become a much more practical possibi-
lity than it is at present, feel unable to be so confident that it would 
in practice be feasible and sustainable, partly because there is no 
relevant historical experience to help form a judgement. 23-
2. TWO APPROACHES TO THE ROLE OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The Group has pursued two lines of economic analysis, which at the out-
set are quite different, but which — as will be seen — converge in their 
conclusions to a considerable degree. 
The first approach is to examine - largely on the basis of empirical case 
studies of relevant countries ¡~\J '
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finance in the macro-economic inter—relations between regions. (Unless 
otherwise specified, the term 'region' is used generally in this report 
to cover not only regions in unitary states, but also the member states 
of existing federations). This examination is concerned with the part 
played by inter-regional flows of public finance in the normal function-
ing of a modern integrated economy. In particular, it is concerned with 
the reduction of differences in average living standards between regions, 
which are typically significantly less than those in average productivity; 
with the extent to which, when the fortunes of different regions diverge 
over short periods, these differences are compensated through the tax and 
expenditure functions of the public sector; and with the part played by 
flows through public channels in financing regional balance of payments 
deficits. 
This first approach may be described as 'looking from the top down'. It 
concerns the regional macro—economic role of public finance in the setting 
of mature economic integration between a number of regions. The results 
of this kind of analysis can be transposed into the Community setting for 
illustrative purposes, but not for the purposes of immediate policy recom-
mendation. It points to the direction in which the Community may move, 
and to the kind of public finance characteristics that typically accompany 
other features of economic and monetary union. 
The second approach may be described as 'looking from the bottom up'. 
In it, one examines the specifio functions of the public sector in the 
supply of given goods and services or through regulation in such sectors 
as agriculture, fisheries, education, health, etc.; and its broader func-
tions, such as income distribution policies, stabilisation, employment 
and growth policies /~10_7 ^° O^J ' Each function is considered against 
criteria which point to whether or not the Community is the most suitable 
level of government for its management. In the Community setting there 
are three to four main levels of government: local government, regional 
governments covering population sizes up to several millions, nation-
state governments covering population sizes up to around fifty millions, 
and the emerging Community tier with a population of two hundred and 
fifty millions or more. 
(ï) Numbers in Γ J refer to the relevant Chapters in Volume II, of 
which the table of contente ie given at the end of this volume. 24-
As will be seen, this approach produces relatively few absolute pres-
criptions as to the level of government at which given functions may 
best be discharged. Rather, it provides some guidelines in relation to 
the Community, around which there will often be a wide range of options 
open for political choice. 25 -
3. THE INTER-REGIONAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN EXISTING FEDERAL AND 
UNITARY STATES 
Economic and monetary integration leads to the progressive loss by states 
of their ability to control trade, exchange rates, and monetary and fis-
cal policy although, as will be seen, the loss of control over fiscal 
policy is only partial in federal systems. While there are gains from 
economic integration, there are also, in the absence of adequate safe-
guards, risks of an uneven distribution of these gains - even to the 
point of some areas being net losers. 
At present these safeguards still largely exist in the form of member 
states' control over the main instruments of economic policy not trans-
ferred to the Community. In maturely integrated economies, however, 
the safeguards have a quite different nature: large-scale inter—regional 
flows of public finance, on both the expenditure and revenue sides, 
coupled to various administrative powers at the centre to influence the 
location of investment and public purchasing. The Group has studied 
the cases of a number of relevant countries in some depth: the four 
largest Community member states (the Federal Republic of Germany /J~3_7, 
France /~2_7, Italy Γα,7 and the United Kingdom /~1 7) and four feder-
ations outside the Community — Australia¡ Canada, Switzerland and the 
United States /~6_7 to /J~9_/· -^ has given more attention to financial 
factors than to regulatory action partly for the simple reason that the 
former can be measured. 
3.1. Inter—regional differences in average per capita levels of income 
and output 
In the countries studied, the net inter-regional flows of public money 
are to a large extent not motivated by explicit regional objectives. 
They arise, however, mainly from inter-regional differences in average 
per capita levels of output and primary income, because high incomes go 
with high tax payments, and low incomes with high receipts of at least 
some centrally-provided services or transfer payments. 
Inter-regional differences in output and income can be traced to a 
variety of causes; for example, unequal natural resource endowment, 
different degrees of accessibility, different levels of investment in 
physical and human capital, and different degrees of dependance on 
industries for whose products demand is growing or declining in the 
national or world market. The processes of capital accumulation and 
migration frequently tend, in the absence of corrective measures, 
towards the cumulative distorted reinforcement of these differences. 26 
Data on differences in average per capita income or output in the 
countries studied are given in Table 1. (ï) 
It should be noted that for the countries shown, but not the Community, 
these figures are already influenced by public expenditure on the in-
comes of civil servants, public procurement and administrative action 
influencing the location of economic activity. Without these influences 
of a central government the inter-regional or state differences would 
probably be larger. 
The extreme figures shown, for the poorest and richest regions, give a 
simple but very imperfect measure of the overall inter-regional inequal-
ity of income distribution. These figures fail to take into account the 
population size of the extreme cases, or the wealth or population size 
of intermediate regions between the extremes. For this a statistically 
more complex measure, the Gini coefficient, is also given which takes 
these factors into account. This measure is explained in the Notes to 
Table 1. The overall results are reasonably consistent as between the 
simple poorest-richest comparison and the statistically superior Gini 
coefficient. Ranked by the Gini coefficient Australia appears to have 
the most equal inter-regional income distribution followed successively 
by Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. France, the United 
States and Canada appear then to be grouped in a similar position, 
before Italy which appears to have the most unequal distribution. 
As to the Community, inter—member state or inter-regional income differ-
ences vary substantially depending on whether the income comparison is 
based on market exchange rates or purchasing power parities. However, 
the degree of income inequality appears to be at least as great between 
member states of the Community as the average regional income inequality 
in the countries studied. 
(ï) Where available Table 1 gives data on GDP and personal income. 
Personal income is defined as the sum of wages, salaries, entre-
preneurial and personal property income; personal taxes and social 
security contributions are not deducted and governmental transfer 
payments (pensions, unemployment insurance benefits, etc.) not 
added. In the assessment of the quantitative redistributive effect 
of public finances (as given in Table 2), personal income is used 
mainly for two reasons: (ï) to improve the comparability of results 
between European and non-European countries for which only personal 
income data exist, and (2) personal income appeared to be more 
relevant to the measurement of redistributive effects. 27 -
Rational or stete par capita product and Incoa« differences 
In relation to national (or Community) average 
Country 
Austral. 
Canada 
United State· 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Cermany 
Coraany 
France 
France 
Italy 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
European Connu-
nity at 9 
member state 
level 
European. Cumu-
lili; at 9 
Bember state 
lerel 
European Commu-
nity at 72 
regici level 
European Coanu-
nity at 72 
region level 
Tear 
1973/74 
1973 
1975 
1972 
1967 
1974 
1970 
1970 
1970 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1964 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1970 
1970 
1970 
1970 
Inooae or 
Output measure (ï) 
Personal Income 
Personal incono 
P.rsonal inooae 
GDP 
Personal inooae 
COP 
Personal incoe. 
asp 
Perianal inooae 
GBP 
Personal Incoa. 
GDP 
Personal inooae 
GDP at current market 
exchange rates 
GDP at purchasing 
power parity exchange 
rates 
P.rsonal incoae at 
current »arket 
exchange rates 
Personal incorno at 
purchasing power 
parity exchange rates 
GDP at current Market 
exchange rates 
ØSP at purchasing 
power parity exchange 
rates (3) 
Personal inooae at 
current market 
exchange rates 
Personal Inooae at 
purchasing power (3) 
parity exchange rates 
Poorest region 
or state 
Taamania 
Newfoundland 
Mississippi 
appenzell i.R. 
Obvalden 
Sch leo wig-Hole t. 
Saar 
Bretagne 
Kldi-Fyrtnoss 
Calabria 
Calabria 
V. Ireland 
B. Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Calabria 
Calabria 
Calabria 
Calabria 
Level 
average 
. 100 
87 
54 
60 
69 
72 
84 
81 
81 
80 
55 
60 
74 
«9 
49 
54 
51 
57 
36 
39 
38 
41 
Richest region 
or state 
lew South Valas 
Ontario 
Alaska 
Washington B.C. 
Connecticut 
Basel Stadt 
Basel Stadt 
Kamburg 
Bremen 
aOrdrhein-West. 
Bsaburg 
Bremen 
Baden-Württemberg 
Pari· 
Parle 
Liguria 
Liguria 
South-east 
South-oast 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Bamburg 
Paris 
Bamburg 
Paris 
Paris 
Bamburg 
Paris 
Bamburg 
Level 
average 
- 100 
105 
117 
175 
125 
120 
151 
143 
149 
118 
104 
133 
.13 
.08 
139 
139 
137 
134 
117 
119 
140 
117 
140 
123 
177 
161 
172 
161 
162 
161 
161 
154 
Kini/Max 
ratio 
1.2 
2.2 
2.9 
1.4 
2.2 
2.0 
1.8 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
2.5 
2.2 
1.6 
1.7 
2.9 
2.2 
Í.7 
2.2 
4-9 
4.4 
4.3 
4.0 
Begr.. of ine-
quality measured 
by Cini (2) 
coefficient 
0.03 
O.O9 
0.09 51 states 
0.06 9 regionsU) 
0.07 
0.07 
O.O5 
0.05 
0.09 
0.09 
0.15 
0.14 
0.07 
0.06 
0.15 
0.09 
0.15 
0.09 
0.15 
0.13 
O.15 
0.13 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
GDP at factor coBt for Cermany; market prices for other countries; regional GDP data do not exist for Australia, Canada and 
the United States. 
Personal income 'aa defined above) for all countries except Italy and Switzerland, for which net national produot at faotor 
oost ia given, sinoe official regional personal income data do not exist* For the European Community see sources. 
lhe Gini ooeffioient of inequality is a weighted average of per ospita incorna differenceo between regions, where relative 
population shares axe used as weights, λ value of 0.0 means exact equality; a value of 1.0 all income ooncentrated in one 
regioni * value around O.05 indicates relatively small Inter—regional Inequality, whereas a value of O.15 indicates already 
substantial inter—regional inequality. This use of population share weights takes into aocount both the size of regions 
and also the distribution of regions falling between the richest and poorest. 
Ho adjustment is made for Inter—regional purchasing power différant i ale within countries. 
The Mini/Max ratio and the Oini ooeffioient refer to the nine census regions in the United States (and not to Washington D.C.)j 
the poorest region is *South-eaat' (index - 77) and the richest »Par Hest» (index - Hi). Table 1 (cont.) 
Sources : 
GDP and personal income (except EEC): see Chapter /~5j> 
EEC 1975 at nine member state level 
GDP - Eurostat, National Accounts Aggregates 196O-1975. 
Personal income - own extrapolation based on GDP figures for 1975 and. 
personal income figures from (d), Country Table 9 (Cols. 1 +2+3+4). 
Purchasing Power Parity - Eurostat, Survey of retail prices and consumer 
purchasing power parities - 1975· 
EEC 197O at 72 region level 
GDP - (c), Table 3. 
Personal income - Germany (a), Table 5 
France (b), Table XI, 1 
Other country data (d), Country Table 9 (Cols. 1 + 2 + 
3 + 4) 
Other regional data: unpublished sources and own 
estimations based on production figures. 
Purchasing Power Parity - (e) and (f). 
(a) Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder : Entstehung, 
Verteilung und Verwendung des Sozialprodukts in den Landern. 
Standardtabellen 1960-1970, Stuttgart 1974. 
(b) INSEE, Régions françaises : Statistiques et indicateurs 1974· 
(c) DIW, "Quantitative und institutionelle Aspekte eines Systems 
öffentlicher Transferieistungen zwischen den Regionen der Euro-
päischen Gemeinschaft", bearbeitet von Fritz Franzmeyer und 
Bernhard Seidel, Berlin 1974. 
(d) OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1962-1973. 
(e) V. Paretti, H. Krijnse Locker, Ph. Goybet, "Comparaison réelle 
du produit intérieur brut des pays de la Communauté européenne", 
Analyse et Prévision, Futuribles, Tome XVIII, Juin 1974 (Published 
on the personal responsibility of the authors). 
(f) Unpublished SOEC working paper. - 29 
3.2. Inter-regional redistributive power of public finance 
The extent of the redistribution between regions provided through the 
public finance system of the countries mentioned is very substantial 
indeed. Table 2 gives estimates of it which indicate for recent years 
the percentage extent to which public finance at the central or federal 
level tends to reduce average per capita income differentials between 
regions /~5_7« Th
e average extent of equalisation in the eight countries 
shown is about 40 per cent, with Australia and France clearly above this 
average and the United States and Germany below (for Switzerland the data 
do not cover social security transactions and so are far from complete). 
The equalising flows of public finance affect the living standards of 
the regions either directly by taxes on or transfers to individuals, or 
indirectly by inter—governmental transfers, or by the direct provision 
of public services. Comparisons are here being made between on the one 
hand income differentials by region (on an average per capita basis), 
and on the other hand these relative income levels modified by the tax, 
transfer and public expenditure policies of the central or federal govern-
ment. Subject to regional differences in savings, this is close to com-
paring relative income and consumption levels, where consumption reflects 
living standards. 
Two measures are given in the Table - one 'unweighted* and the other 
•weighted· by population. The difference between these two measures -
though quantitatively unimportant with the territorial divisions used 
for their estimates in most countries - involves a significant politi-
cal and economic issue of relevance for the Community case. Using the 
'unweighted' measure implies that all regions are regarded as equal 
units, this corresponding to the extreme confederal principle of 'one 
state - one vote'. The 'weighted» measure takes into account the popu-
lation size of each region, and is thus more meaningful in relation to 
a unitary state where the central government is based on the principle 
of 'one person - one vote'. (ï) 
(1) If the change in income differentials due to redistribution were 
the same for all regions, i.e. in all poor regions income increased, 
and in all rioh ones decreased, by the same peroentage relative to 
the average, the two measures give identical results. If the per-
centage change in income differentials above or below the average 
is different between regions, the measures give in general differ-
ent results. If, for instance, a small poor region is treated rela-
tively favourably, this will tend to make the unweighted measure 
show a greater degree of redistribution than the weighted one. 
In the Community the 'unweighted' measure would thus indicate al-
ready substantial redistributive effects if only Ireland and a small 
number of regions in, say, Italy and the United Kingdom were to be 
treated favourably by Community finances, whereas the same order of 
magnitude would be shown by the 'weighted' measure only if Community 
finances favoured a larger share of below average income population. -30-
Table 2 
Percentage extent to which inter-regional income differences 
are reduced by central or federal public finances 
Federations 
Germany 
Australia 
Canada 
U.S.A. 
Switzerland (ï) 
Average of federations 
(2) 
Unitary states 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Average of unitary 
states 
Average of federations 
and unitary states (2) 
Average of individual 
regions' reduction in 
per capita personal 
income (3) differences 
(regions un-weiphted 
by population) 
29 
53 
32 
28 
(22) 
35 
54 
47 
36 
46 
40 
Change in Gini coefficient 
of regional personal in-
come (3) inequality due 
to public finances 
(regions weighted by popu-
lation) 
39 
53 
28 
23 
(10) 
36 
52 
44 
31 
42 
39 
(ï) Excluding social security. 
(2) Excluding Switzerland because of its incompleteness. 
(3) See Table 1 and Notes to Table 1. - 31 -
The overall redistributive effects observed differ as between federal 
and unitary states: for federal states the average is in the order of 
35 %, whereas it is about 45 % for unitary states. There is, however, 
a considerable dispersion about these averages, with some federations 
achieving greater redistribution than certain unitary states. While 
differences in the scale of public finance activities undoubtedly 
influence these results there is no simple connection between budget 
size and redistributive effects. Table 3 summarises the share of total 
and federal or central public expenditure as a share of GDP in the 
countries concerned (where the top level expenditure includes all grants 
to lower levels): 
Table 3 
Public expenditure as a percentage share of GDP at market prices 
Germany (1971) 
France (l972) 
Italy (1972) 
United Kingdom (1972) 
Australia (1972/73) 
Canada (l97l/72) 
Switzerland (1973) 
United States (l97l/72) 
all levels of 
government 
41 -1 
38.3 
41.1 
41-5 
27-9 
38.5 
39-8 
37.6 
central or 
federal governments 
24.7 
35-4 
35-7 
33.9 
22.5 
19.3 
23-6 (9-7)* 
22.8 
* excluding social security 
It is important to note that, although the net inter-regional transfers 
serve to offset so high a proportion of inter-regional differences in 
incomes (more than half of them in some cases), they are not themselves 
very large as proportions of GDP - only 2.5 96 of it in the United States, 
for example, 3·7 % in the United Kingdom, and 4.2 % in Italy /~5_7· 32-
3·3· Inter-regional balance of payments and public finance balances 
The redistributive power of central and federal budgets has major econo­
mic consequences for the regions and states. The inter-regional flows 
of public finance reflect the fact that in the richer regions there 
tends to be a surplus of taxation over public expenditure, which is 
effectively paid over by their citizens or governments, helping to sus­
tain a current account surplus on the regional balance of payments and 
conversely in the poorer regions. This amounts to a real resource 
transfer from rich to poor regions or states, financed by the federal 
or central budget, though it must be remembered that other items enter 
into regional external balances - net inflows of real resources may be 
financed by private lending, for example, on which direct information 
is rarely available. The figures in Table 4 for selected regions or 
states in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom serve to give 
an idea of the approximate orders of magnitude that seem to be involved 
Z~
1 J *° Ζ~47· 
Table 4 shows that net flows of public finance in the range of 3 - 10 % 
of regional product are common for both relatively rich and relatively 
poor regions, but a few of the latter enjoy considerably higher net in­
flows, up to around 30 % of regional product. This fits with the rather 
general rule that small, poor and peripheral regions tend to be gener­
ously aided by the centre. These deficits and surpluses are relatively 
permanent in comparison with those caused by short-term recessions, and 
will often require major structural changes to remove them. 
3.4· The inter-regional stabilising role of public finance 
The analysis so far has not touched on the stabilising role of the pub­
lic finance system with respect to short-run or cyclical changes in the 
economic fortunes of given regions, which is related to but not the same 
as the long run or permanent role of public finance in tending to equal­
ise their living standards. Regions within a modern integrated economy 
are exposed to greater risks in relation to their income of adverse 
economic developments outside their control than is the national economy 
as a whole, but these risks are covered by public finance transfers to 
an even higher degree than long-term differences in per capita production. 
Both for sovereign countries as a whole and in federal states and regions, 
activity and income may be affected by either internal or external auto­
nomous changes in demand. Internal changes can be offset to some degree 
by adjustments to public expenditure or taxation in the area in question. 
In any case, since tax revenue tends to vary automatically and directly 
with activity, and some items of expenditure (notably social security 
and relief payments) vary automatically and inversely with it, the normal 
working of public finance tends to smooth out fluctuations in personal 
disposable incomes, and in employment in those activities that supply 
mainly the local market, even without decisions of policy. - 33 -
Table 4 
Public finance balance and balance of payments 
as percentage of gross regional product 
relatively poor 
regions or states 
Germany (average 1968-70) 
Niedersachsen 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Saarland 
France (l972) 
Bretagne 
U.K. (1964) 
Wales 
Scotland 
N. Ireland 
Italy (average 1971-73) 
Umbria 
Abruzzi 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
relatively rich 
regions or states 
Germany (average 1968-7O) 
Baden-WUrttemberg 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Hessen 
U.K. (1964) 
South East 
West Midlands 
Italy (average 1971-73) 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Liguria 
public finance 
outflow (-) or 
inflow (+) (1) 
+ 3-4 
+ 6.0 
+ 9.O 
+ 11.0 
+ 7.8 
+ 6.1 
+ 16.1 
+ 7.8 
+ 14.8 
+ 28.0 
+ 23.5 
- 5-9 
- 4-5 
- 2.9 
- 4.8 
- 2.9 
- 7-4 
- 11.1 
- 4.4 
balance of payments 
current account surplus 
or deficit (-) (2) 
- 6.5 
- 9-8 
- 13.6 
- 15.O 
- 12.1 
- 7.8 
- 21.7 
- 17.4 
- 14.8 
- 42.3 
- 25.8 
+ 7-9 
+ 5.2 
+ 2.2 
+ 2.4 
+ 3.2 
+ 10.9 
+ 15-3 
+ 12.6 
(+) 
(ï) Difference between federal or central expenditures and revenues allo-
cated to the region. For Italy the substantial national deficit is 
allocated to the regions in proportion to regional product. 
(2) Difference between regional product and domestic expenditures. -34-
Where the original, autonomous change in the pattern of demand is an 
internal one, no further problem in relation to the balance of payments 
arises from this built-in stabilising function of public finance. But 
where it is an external one - say, a decline in demand for the country's 
or region's exports — the maintenance of personal disposable incomes and 
expenditure is bound to lead to a change in the area's balance of exter-
nal trade. In the face of a fall in its exports, for instance, the 
maintenance of its absorption of goods and services necessarily worsens 
that balance, whereas, in the absence of any internal stabilising mech-
anism, employment and incomes would be decreased through the multiplier 
mechanism, though not automatically to the point where imports are 
reduced as much as exports. 
It is here that two differences between the region (including the federal 
state) on the one hand and the separate sovereign state on the other, 
become very important. In the first place, the region normally has most 
of the maintenance of its absorption of goods and services (and hence 
of its imports), in the face of a reduction in its exports, financed by 
national or federal sources; its citizens pay less in national or federal 
taxation and receive more from national or federal social security funds. 
No problem therefore arises in financing the deficit in its balance of 
trade. The sovereign state, on the other hand, maintains its absorption 
of goods and services only by creating the necessary purchasing power 
for itself, and unless it started with a sufficient export surplus can 
maintain the resulting surplus of imports over exports only so long as 
it is able to borrow from abroad, or draw on accumulated reserves. 
Secondly, the region in an integrated economy is in no position to con-
tribute to the correction of its balance of trade (if that were necessary) 
by either erecting trade—barriers or devaluing its currency. Market 
forces may reduce its price level in relation to other areas and so in-
crease its competitiveness, but they will often operate only slowly and 
imperfectly. The sovereign state can, subject to the necessary measure 
of international agreement, use either trade-barriers or devaluation, or 
both, to reduce its trade deficit - to shift demand from foreign goods 
and services to domestically-produced ones. 
The difficulty for a country which joins with others in a common market 
and common monetary system without a developed central system of public 
finance, therefore, is that, like a region or federal state within a 
developed economy, it cannot use trade-barriers or currency-devaluation 
to help it to adjust to, for instance, a fall in demand for its exports 
or a rise in the price of its imports, nor does the built-in stabilis-
ation produced by its public finance system carry with it a built-in 
financing of the import surpluses which stabilisation of income may cause. 
If internal activity is to be in some degree stabilised, pending either 
a structural adjustment of the economy to its changed circumstances or 
an autonomous reversal of the original cause of the trouble, then the - 35-
country, unless it started with a sufficient export surplus, must be 
able to borrow from abroad or to draw on reserves. If it cannot dc J, 
then employment cannot be maintained; it has to be reduced, perhap-" ι 
something like the proportion by which export earnings fall short o„ 
import expenditure. 
Empirical evidence on the internal and external stability of regional 
and national economies is not easily available. It has been estimated 
for the United Kingdom regions /~1_/, and in France for Bretagne /™2_7, 
that the regional economies are several times as 'open' - the ratio of 
their imports, or exports, to their gross product is several times as 
great - as is the case with the United Kingdom or the French economy as 
a whole. It is more strictly to the point that the proportion of their 
gross product, or their value added, incorporated in goods or services, 
sold outside their boundaries, is also much higher (perhaps by a factor 
of two or three) than for the national economies of which they are part. 
Even that does not demonstrate conclusively that demand for their pro­
ducts is exposed to correspondingly larger proportionate variations 
through changes external to them. It does, however, create a strong 
presumption that this is so. 
As to the degree of automatic compensation for these risks, it has been 
estimated from French and U.K. data that as much as one-half to two-
thirds of a short-term loss of primary income due to, for example, a 
fall in a region's external sales may be offset through the public 
finance system, and much the same may be true of regions in other modern 
integrated economies. Moreover, the Openness' of regional economies 
also means that much of the secondary loss of income due to the remain­
ing falls in external earnings not compensated by publio finance occurs 
in other regions rather than the one initially affected. The eventual 
reduction in personal disposable income in the initially affected region 
might well be as little as a third of the initial fall in external 
demand for its factors of production - and no complications would ensue 
through the effect on its balance of payments. 
On the other hand, a member of the Community suffering a proportionately 
much smaller initial disturbance might, because of absence of any sub­
stantial compensation through the Community finances, find its balance 
of payments so seriously in deficit that the difficulty of meeting the 
situation by borrowing could force upon it a reduction of income larger, 
perhaps much larger, than the initial fall in its export earnings. This 
absence between Community members of the substantial compensatory public 
finance mechanism that works between regions inside integrated states is 
thus of great importance as an obstacle to fuller Community integration. - 36 
3·5· Main instruments of inter-regional redistribution 
On the tax side, the personal income tax is in most countries the pre-
dominant instrument of progressive inter-regional redistribution ¿9_/· 
In all the countries studied the main public expenditure programmes and 
social security benefit systems Γ&7 tend to have substantial inter-
regional redistributive effects, especially in centralised states where 
national policies provide roughly equal per capita benefits (which pro-
duce a net equalising effect so long as primary incomes differ). In 
France and Italy the massive migration from poorer areas to the cities 
lead to major net flows of social security finance to poor regions, with 
their high ratios of children, women not seeking work and retired people. 
Features particular to individual countries are the important regional 
effects of defence procurement policies in the United States, and in 
Italy the major use of capital transfers to regional development agencies 
and for public infrastructure! investment in the poorer regions. 
In the federations, inter-governmental grant systems or tax-sharing 
arrangements (~&J play a large part in inter-regional redistribution, 
in addition to the effects of direct central government expenditure pro-
grammes. In Australia and Canada there are major general purpose grant 
systems that tend to equalise the fiscal capacity of the states and 
provinces; in Germany similar results are reached through tax-sharing 
arrangements and horizontal transfers between Länder, with a more modest 
role for federal grants. As the counterpart, the states are responsible 
for a large part of education, health and other public expenditure func-
tions which are provided in other countries by the central government. 
These budget equalisation mechanisms in the three countries mentioned 
account for around one-third to a half of the entire inter-state redis-
tribution of public finance; these can be, from the redistributive point 
of view, very high powered instruments, e.g. in Germany equalisation 
grants amount to only 0.3 per cent of GNP. 
In addition, specific purpose grant systems (providing matching or lump-
sum grants for such programmes as regional development and roads) lead, 
in these three countries, to a further more limited redistribution of 
public funds /~7_7· The relative mix between general and specific pur-
pose grants in federal systems is a major variable for political choice. 
The United States contrasts with the federations just mentioned in making 
very heavy use of specific purpose grants (with hundreds of individual 
programmes) and relatively slight although growing use of general purpose 
grants ('general revenue-sharing'); 'Food Stamps' and urban redevelopment 
programmes are among the specific purpose grants with highest inter-state 
redistributive effects. Switzerland is closer to the United States model 
than the other three federations, with relatively small-scale use of 
general purpose grants and an extensive use of specific purpose grants. -37-
Analogous but smaller scale systems of grants exist in the unitary states 
in the financial relations between central and local governments. In 
France and Italy these have little redistributive power; in the United 
Kingdom the 'rate support grant' is a type of budget equalisation system 
with stronger redistributive characteristics. 
Overall the pattern of inter-regional redistribution of public finance 
may be summarised in the following terms: 
- there is on the whole more variation in the instruments by which 
the redistribution is achieved than in the extent and nature of 
the change it produces in inter-regional income differences; 
- there is an important distinction between federations using large-
scale budget equalisation systems and other countries. The former 
achieve relatively large redistributive results with relatively 
small amounts of federal expenditure because the net inter-regional 
transfers are to a smaller extent than elsewhere the result of 
differences between large payments in opposite directions; 
- in the unitary states a large part of total inter-regional redis-
tribution is automatic and 'invisible*. In decentralised, federal 
countries a much higher share of the total redistributive power is 
explicitly voted or negotiated on a geographic basis; 
- regional policy narrowly and explicitly defined as such (excluding, 
for example, budget equalisation systems and general public invest-
ment in roads and schools, etc.) provides only a relatively minor 
component of the overall financial redistribution process, Italy 
being an exception. 
expenditure, taxation  3.6. Main features of federal financial systems; 
and grants 
The shares of public expenditure /~8_/ accounted for by the federal and 
lower levels of government in the five federations studied are as follows: 
Table 5 
Federal expenditure as a percentage share of total government expenditure 
Germany (1971) 
Australia (1972/73) 
Canada (1971/72) 
Switzerland (1973) 
United States (l97l/72) 
final ex-
penditure 
56 
50 
38 
52 
52 
final civil domes-
tic expenditure 
51 
42 
34 
39 
40 
financing of 
total expenditure 
60 
81 
50 
59 
60 38 
The first column (final expenditure) excludes from the federal share 
grants to lower levels of government, but includes national social 
security or social insurance systems: the federal share of all expen-
diture on this definition ranges between 38 # in Canada to 56 # in 
Germany. Defence and external relations and development aid are always 
entirely federal level responsibilities. If those functions are ex-
cluded, the federal share of final civil domestic expenditure ranges 
from 34 % in Canada to 51 % in Germany. Thus countries choosing the 
federal form of government are able to maintain a very high degree of 
economic integration while leaving a high proportion of civil domestic 
public spending in the hands of lower levels of government, subject to 
only partial, or to no influence by the federal government. For such 
large spending functions as education, health, housing and road con-
struction, there are several instances among the federations studied 
where the federal governments have hardly any direct spending respon-
sibility. The main domestic expenditure field where there is predomi-
nant federal responsibility is in social security systems, although in 
the United States as much as one-third of social security and welfare 
expenditure is undertaken by state or local governments. 
The share of the federal government in providing finance is in all cases, 
however, considerably hi^ier. Federal direct expenditure plus grants 
to lower levels of government range from 5O % of total expenditure in 
Canada to 81 % in Australia. 
This also broadly reflects the situation as regards taxation /"~16 7 
(althou^i there are differences due to federal borrowing and lending 
operations, which will not be analysed here). Federal tax revenues as 
a share of total taxation excluding social security contributions in 
the federations have in recent years ranged from 41 % in Switzerland, 
from 53 $ to 58 % for Germany, Canada and the United States, to 80 % 
for Australia - as compared to 90 % or more for the central government 
tax share in France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
As regards the distribution of the main taxes between levels of govern-
ment in the federations, there are few general rules beyond the facts 
that customs duties are always federal, and property taxes always local 
or state. For personal and corporate income tax, general sales taxes 
and excises there is a broad range of practices which very often involve 
the simultaneous exploitation of tax bases by federal and state levels 
of government; either by tax-sharing arrangements where the revenues 
from single income taxes and value-added taxes are divided by formulae 
between levels of government (as in the German model) or in tax-over-
lapping arrangements where federal and state levels of government apply 
their own rates and often their own bases in the same field of taxation 
(as in North America and Switzerland). The tax-overlapping arrangements 
mean that many major taxes are unharmonised at the state level in these 
countries, although cooperative arrangements seek to limit the harmful 
effects of fiscal competition between levels of government and between 
states. - 39 -
Federal governments' surpluses of fiscal resources over their direct 
expenditure responsibilities are reflected in the important intergovern-
mental grant or transfer mechanisms, amounting in recent years to the 
following orders of magnitude: 
Table 6 
Intergovernmental grants or transfers as a percentage share of GNP 
United States (1973/74) 
Germany (1973) 
Canada (1973/74) 
Australia (1973/74) 
genered purpose grants 
or transfers 
0.4 
0.3 (1) 
1.0 
3.1 
specific purpose 
grants 
2.7 
1.7 
3.2 
2.4 
(ï) Excluding VAT tax-sharing (see further below). 
Three main types of grant or transfer may be identified /f~13_7· 
- general purpose grants for redressing vertical fiscal imbalance 
- general purpose grants or transfers for fiscal equalisation purposes 
- specific purpose grants for the pursuit of particular objectives. 
With all three types, the federal or donor level of government is able 
to pursue objectives which are proper to it, but without fundamentally 
undermining the autonomy of lower levels of government. Financial aids 
and incentives are provided to lower level governments in such a way as 
to induce and enable, but not enforce, attainment of federal objectives. 
There are, however, different ways in which this can be done, and the 
differences between them are important. 
The first type, grants for redressing fiscal imbalance between higher 
and lower levels of government, is illustrated by the United States so-
called 'general revenue-sharing' system. In the Community context they 
are of no foreseeable relevance because fiscal imbalance in favour of 
the Community is not in sight /~6_7, /~10_7. - 40 
The second type, general purpose equalisation grants and transfers Γ SJ, 
/jO 7ι /~13_/i
 
aim
s
 
t
0 enable state levels of government to provide 
adequate standards of public services in the areas for which they are 
responsible without forcing the poorer states to impose significantly 
higher tax burdens, and without depriving state governments of the free-
dom to manage these services according to their own preferences. For 
example, different regions may give different degrees of priority to 
certain categories of public expenditure, have different preferences as 
to how to organise certain public services and so on, and these are left 
open for the state authorities to handle. However, the 'fiscal capacity' 
of the states is affected. (Fiscal capacity is defined for this purpose 
as the amount of tax revenue that would be yielded in a given state 
through applying a given tax system, plus the revenue it receives from 
federal grants.) In the relatively similar family of systems used in 
Germany, Australia and Canada, grants or transfers are made so as to 
raise the fiscal capacity of poorer states up to a politically decided 
standard - 100 % of the national average in Canada, and the standard of 
the two dominant and wealthiest states in Australia. A standard of 97 % 
of the national average is reached in Germany under quite different con-
stitutional arrangements (see below). 
The economic function of these systems, apart from their formal public 
finance role, may be seen as (a) preventing excessive flows of migration 
that can be induced, in homogeneous and mobile societies, by sharp diffe-
rences in local taxation or public service levels, and (b) providing an 
element of broad inter-regional redistribution with respect to the econ-
omic fortunes of the union. In Australia in the pre-war period, and in 
Canada from the outset of the confederation to the present day, the 
fiscal equalisation systems, or their more ad hoc antecedent systems, 
have played quite prominant parts in the formation and holding together 
of the unions. 
The German equalisation system has particularly interesting features. 
It is in three parts. The first element is built into the sharing 
between Länder of their part of the value added tax (VAT). A certain 
amount of VAT revenue is allocated not according to the Land of tax 
collection or its incidence, but by a formula which brings the poorer 
Lander's fiscal capacity up to 92 % of the per capita average of all 
Lander. The second element carries per capita fiscal capacity equalis-
ation to the 95 % minimum level. This is achieved not by federal grants 
(as mentioned, the Bund does not have as large a fiscal surplus as in 
other federations) but by direct horizontal financial transfers from the 
richer Länder (Hamburg, Baden-WUrttemberg, etc.) out of their own fiscal 
resources to the poorer Länder (Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, etc.); 
this is known as the Lände rf inan ζ aus gle i eh (state financial compensation). 
The third element consists of supplementary grants (Er^LnzungsZuweisungen) 
from the Blind which have the effect of bringing the poorer Länder up to 
approximately 97 Ί» minimum per capita fiscal capacity compared to the 
average of all Länder. 41 -
The horizontal form of the Länderfinanzausgleich payments, which do not 
enter into the federal budget, compares with the more usual vertical 
form, as in Australia, Canada and the United States, where the federal 
level makes grants to the state level. The two forms can, however, give 
precisely the same results; the choice is a question of political pref-
erence or constitutional convenience. The horizontal form is the most 
transparent, which is an advantage for ease of analysis; even in Germany, 
however, only a part of the system takes this form. 
Turning to the third type, specific purpose grants /~7_7» /~10_7, /~13_7, 
the most important form is the matching grant, whereby the federal 
government provides a given percentage of the total for a given public 
expenditure programme, thus 'matching' the effort of the lower level of 
government. The federal matching ratio cheapens the effective price 
(known sometimes as the 'tax-price') at which the lower level of govern-
ment can supply a given public service, incentive or infrastructure! 
investment. The reason why the federal government should wish to do this 
is usually that the benefits from the function in question accrue in a 
significant measure beyond the frontiers of the lower level of government 
(these are known as 'externality' or 'spillover' effects). For example, 
in highly mobile societies the public benefits of education expenditure 
may be lost to the supplying state through emigration; or the benefits 
from regional policy go beyond the benefits that accrue to the aided 
region by reducing congestion costs in the metropolis. Put in more 
political terms, where there are significant and legitimate federal 
interests at stake in public expenditure sectors which are principally 
assigned to lower levels of government (e.g. a comparable general level 
of education, or a regionally balanced distribution of economic activity), 
there is a case for matching grants to induce lower levels of government 
to design their public expenditure programmes in ways that take adequate 
account of federal objectives. 
Most countries have experience in the use of specific purpose grants, 
including all the federations. The relative use of general versus speci-
fic purpose grants is a major variable in the design of federal systems, 
with the United States and Switzerland making relatively strong use of 
the specific purpose grant form. Germany uses specific purpose grants 
in the areas designated in the constitution as Gerne ins chafts aufgaben 
(shared expenditure functions); similar techniques are used in French 
local government. At the Community level the Regional, Social and FEOGA 
Guidance Section funds are all of this family. 
There are three technical points on the use of specific purpose grants 
which should be highlighted because of their major policy implications: 
first, the question of lump-sum (or quota-defined) versus 'open-ended' 
specific grants, secondly the possible use of the 'variable matching 
grant* form as a means of simultaneously pursuing sectoral and fiscal 
equalisation objectives, and, thirdly, the question of how far the multi-
plicity of specific purpose grant schemes can go without encountering -42-
problems. All three questions in fact concern the same fundamental 
iBSue: how to define and manage the frontier between sectoral and fiscal 
equalisation activities /~10_7. 
Lump-sum (quota) or open-ended grants. It is not infrequently found 
that allegedly specific purpose grant programmes are designed in such a 
way as to give the recipient government a fixed sum of money in aid of 
a particular activity. Such grants are easily transformed into general 
purpose grants; they have no necessary effect on the specific purpose 
intended unless either of two conditions are satisfied: (a) the donor 
government has parallel regulatory powers to influence the level of 
service or expenditure provided by the recipient government (which is 
often the case in local government systems), or (b) the fixed sum is 
larger than the amount that the recipient government would have spent 
on the function in question in its absence. Otherwise, the specific 
purpose will tend to be illusory and unenforceable; the distribution 
of the grants may or may not be consistent with fiscal equalisation 
objectives. 
Variable or uniform matching ratios. More positively, however, there 
is a form of specific purpose grant that has the qualities of, on the 
one hand, limiting the budgetary cost of the pure open-ended matching 
grant, and on the other hand, permitting a simultaneous pursuit of sec-
toral and redistributive objectives. This is the variable matching 
ratio grant, under which the percentage contribution of the federal or 
higher level of government is varied in accordance with objective cri-
teria, for example the fiscal capacity of the recipient state, and/or 
the relative importance to the higher level of government of an expansion 
of the expenditure function in a particular form or region. The donor 
government's matching ratio may range, for example, between 20 to 80 per 
cent. At the higher matching ratios the recipient government has a very 
powerful incentive to shape its public expenditure programme to favour 
federal objectives. This form of grant may, for example, be particularly 
suitable for programmes intended to have a broad regional policy impact; 
indeed, use of the extreme case of a 0 % matching ratio is equivalent to 
a zoning of regions ineligible for 'federal* aid. 
Multiplicity. As to the efficient number of specific purpose grant 
schemes, the evidence from the United States (which had over four hundred 
such programmes) and France (whose regional and local government finances 
have about one hundred and fifty) is that there is a definite limit be-
yond which the system as a whole may degenerate into a game of 'grants-
manship' for the recipient government; from the donor's point of view, 
it becomes a complex web of partially contradictory and overlapping in-
centives whose effects are very difficult to monitor. The corrective 
solution, Been in the countries mentioned, appears to consist of either 
consolidating programmes into broader categories, or replacing them by 
general purpose equalisation grants. - 43 
4. PERSPECTIVES FOR THE HJBLIC FINANCE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY 
In this chapter we come to the approach described earlier as looking 
at the problem "from the bottom up". It first sets out the various 
public expenditure functions grouped under headings that are convenient 
for analytical purposes together with statistics on the present 
amounts of expenditure by all levels of government in member countries 
and the Community institutions. Second, it explains the criteria that 
may be used for assessing the case for or against Community involvement 
in individual public expenditure and regulatory functions. Third, it 
applies these criteria to the Community in the context of the political 
scenarios already described - 'pre-federal' integration, 'small public 
sector federation' and 'large public sector federation'. 
4.1. Supply of public goods and services, and regulatory activities 
In I97O /~12 / total public expenditure by all levels of government in 
the nine Community countries amounted to some 40 % of GDP (Table 7)· 
Within this total the first heading, 'general public services', covers 
those functions which in general benefit the whole population and 
where the benefit cannot be easily allocated to individuals or groups: 
the cost of public administration, international relations, public 
order and safety, defence, and general research. Expenditure under 
these categories totalled 8 $ of GDP. 
The second heading, 'social and welfare services', includes education, 
health, housing and social security and welfare. These activities in 
the first instance benefit individuals, although the public as a whole 
also benefits to a significant extent. Their total cost amounted to 
23 % of GDP, or a little over half or all public expenditure. 
The third heading, 'economic services', covers expenditure that aims to 
influence the functioning of the market economy through infrastructure 
investment, or through the provision of subsidies to given sectors 
(agriculture, mining, industry, etc.), or to given regions, or to 
improve the working of the labour market. Expenditure under these hea-
dings amounted to 6 % of GDP. A particular feature here is that public 
expenditure is often highly substitutable for regulatory non-financial 
intervention (as, for example, in regional policy). Moreover, there 
are many areas of regulatory activity relevant to the Community which 
rarely involve any significant public expenditure (reference to some 
of these is made below). - 44-
Table 7 
Total Public Expenditure in the Community 
Estimated percentage share of GDP in 1970 
General Public Services 
general administration 
international relations 
public order and safety 
general research 
defence 
Social and Welfare Services 
education 
health 
social security and welfare (excl. health) 
old age and survivors 
invalidity and disability 
unemployment 
family, maternity, child allowances 
other 
housing and community amenities 
sanitary services 
housing and other 
Economic Services 
agriculture 
mining, manufacturing, construction 
electricity, gas, water 
roads 
inland and coastal waterways 
other transport and communications 
other 
Other (including debt interest) 
Total 
2.45 
0.68 
1.13 
0.97 
2.82 
5.29 
5-33 
10.50 
5.80 
1.81 
O.29 
2.08 
0.51 
I.90 
O.64 
1.26 
I.69 
0.21 
0.40 
1.17 
O.19 
O.84 
I.56 
8.O5 
23.02 
6.23 
2.82 
4O.I3 
Note: Public expenditure is defined to cover all levels of government 
including social security organisations. But public corporations 
(railways, etc.) are generally not consolidated, i.e. only 
capital transfers or subsidies from the central government to 
these bodies are counted as public expenditure. GDP is defined 
at market prices. 45 -
Aggregate public expenditure has increased substantially since 1970, 
reaching about 45 % of GDP in 19751 partly reflecting the effects of 
the recession of that year. While detailed figures by expenditure 
functions are not yet available, the main increases since 1970 are 
known to have been mainly in social security and welfare benefits, and 
health and education expenditure. 
Expenditure by the Community institutions is shown in Table 8 for 
1976 and 1977· Total current expenditure in 1977 is forecast to amount 
■to 0.7 of 1 per cent of Community GDP, or 10 billion units of 
account (l). Community expenditure in 1976 accounted for about 60 % 
of all agricultural and fishing subsidies, about 13 fo of all develop-
ment aid, around 10 % of regional policy and manpower training 
aids, and about 1 -g- % of publicly financed research in the member 
countries. / 12 / 
In addition, there are financial intermediary functions. For example, 
the European Investment Bank and Coal and Steel Community are both 
currently lending at a rate of around 1 billion u.a. (l) per annum, 
and the Community Loan facility was drawn on for the first time in 
1976· (However, the public expenditure figures for all levels of 
government, as in Table 7i exclude all such financial intermediaries.) 
A highly summarised view of the criteria for or against Community in-
volvement in the main functions of the public sector is set out in 
Table 9· The three main criteria used - economies of scale, externali-
ties or spill-overs, and political homogeneity - will now be explained 
with some short examples. A more systematic account, function by 
function, follows; detail is given in Chapters /~11 / and /~12 /· 
(l) For definitions and amount in U.S. dollars see Table 8 and the 
Notes to Table 8. 46 
Table S 
Expenditure by all Community Institutions 
; ' ΓΓ2Ι 
(payment appropriations J 
(1) 
General Public Services 
general administration 
international relations 
(primarily aid) 
public order and Safety 
(Court of Justice) 
general research 
Social and Welfare Services 
education (maini- European 
schools) 
social security and welfare 
housing 
Economic Services 
agriculture, fisheries, 
foreßtry (incl. monetary 
compensatory amounts) 
mining, manufacturing 
(coal, steel) 
energy 
manpower policy 
regional policy 
States of collection costs 
for own resources (10$0 of 
own resources) 
Other 
Total 
Total (in millions U.S. dollars) 
Financial Intermediary Loans (gro 
European Coal and Steel Commun 
European Investment Bank 
Community Loan 
Total (including loans) 
1976 
million units 
41S 
746 
11 
140 
19 
27 
25 
6,168 
61 
30 
513 
300 
503 
7' 
8,988 
i 10,843 
,s) 
ity f 1,152 -
¿ 727 -
f 1,323 -
r< 14,045 
1977 
of account^ ' 
469 
681 
13 
190 
22 
30 
30 
6,749 
70 
60 
663 
400 
5S5 
33 
10,015 
¡S 12,082 
1,030 EUA (*' 
65O EUA 
1,183 EUA 
1977 
Í> of GDP 
0.03 
υ.05 
0.02 
.. 
·· 
0.47 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.04 
■· 
0.70 
(1) 
(2) 
ÍS 
Including non-budgetized expenditures (i.e. European Development Pund 
and ECSC). 
Figurée for 1977 follow the Bane method of presentation as 1976 for 
reasons of comparability (so-called "real approach**)· 
Budget units of account (see Kotes). 
European units of account (Bee Notes). 
Notes: The budget unit of account is defined in terms of conversion rates 
which were the last parities for national currencies declared to the MP. 
AB from I978 the budget expenditure will be expressed in European units of 
account - which ie already used by the ECSC and EIB. ThiB unit of account 
is defined in termB of a fixed basket of the currencies of the member states. 
Its conversion rates are based on the valuation of the basket using market 
exchange rates. The budget unit of account uBes fixed exchange rates. 
1 u.a. - FB/FLux 50, DKr 7-5, DM 3.66, HF1 3.62, FF 5.55, Lit 625, £ O.4I66 
(The implicit exchange rate of the US f¡ is I.2O635). The European unit of 
account in 1976 had the following average exchange rates: 1 EUA = FB 43.16, 
DKr 6.76, 33H 2.82, HF1 2.96, FF 5.34, Lit 930.15, £ 0.6215, US f, 1.12. -47-
The term 'economies of scale* is used broadly here to cover not only 
its usual technological meaning (that as the scale of production rises, 
the physical volume of output rises faster than that of inputs), but 
also the case where more favourable terms of trade or results of poli-
tical bargaining may be obtained from pooled efforts in external nego-
tiations. Such economies in the technological sense apply mostly to 
expenditure on advanced technology; the bargaining power type of 
'economies of scale' applies obviously to external relations; but 
both types apply to defence. That economies of scale render a function 
prima facie suitable for handling at the Community level rather than 
at national levels is obvious. 
The 'externality or spillover' criterion applies where given policies 
necessarily have effects reaching in a significant degree across all 
(or several) member states, and where it is impractical or unde-
sirable to try to limit these trans-national effects or control them 
at the national level. These constitute reasons for referring the 
activity, at least partially, to a 'higher' level of government than 
the member state. In external relations and defence these trans-
national effects reinforce 'economies of scale' as grounds for acti-
vity above the member state level. The 'externality' argument does not 
apply, however, to the advanced technology functions since patents, 
licensing and secrecy permit the exclusive 'club' form of organisation, 
which is not practical for general public service functions such as 
external relations and defence. The social and welfare services are 
marked 'little now, but future yes' under this heading: this derives 
from the spillover of costs and benefits that occur with large-scale 
migration. Until and unless such migration becomes a major factor 
there will be only a limited case against the national management 
of these functions. Externalities are relevant in the case of struc-
tural and cyclical policies for two basic reasons. First, there are 
the transnational effects of national policies (through trade, prices, 
exchange rates and business sentiment). Secondly, there is the poten-
tial for Community level intervention in regional, manpower, unemploy-
ment, and general inter-member state redistribution policies to 
balance out the gains and losses from the general integration process 
sufficiently convincingly to enable this process to go ahead further, 
and so generate larger gains in the aggregate for the Community as a 
whole than would, otherwise be the case. - 48 -
Table 9 
Criteria for Assessing the Case for or against Community 
Level Involvement in Public Sector Functions 
General Public Services 
external non-defence "") 
(trade, aid, energy, I 
political cooperation) J 
defence 
public administration, ~i 
law and order _ƒ 
Social and Welfare Services 
education, health, "J 
social security, (l) ΐ 
housing 
Economic Services 
market intervention ~) 
functions (agriculture, J 
fisheries, oil) -' 
market regulation "J 
functions (technical S 
norms, competition, etc)J 
advanced technology 
structural and cycli- ") 
cal policies (regional, y 
manpower, unemploy- J 
ment) (2) ·> 
Economies 
of scale 
yes 
yes 
some 
-
-
seleotive 
yes 
yes 
Externalities 
or Spillovers 
yes 
yes 
some 
little now, 
future yes 
selective 
yes 
some 
yes 
yes 
Political 
Homogeneity* 
adequate or 
under 
negotiation 
no 
some 
no 
adequate or 
under 
negotiation 
adequate or 
under 
negotiation 
some now, 
future ? 
some now, 
future ? 
(1) excluding unemployment compensation 
(2) including unemployment compensation 
* As seen at present under a "pre-federal integration" hypothesis. 
This political criterion is potentially subject to more change over 
time than the other two economic criteria. 49 
By 'political homogeneity' is meant the degree of cohesion between member 
states that would enable a function to be dealt with at the Communi 
level if other reasons existed for doing this. The 'political homo¿ ity' 
criterion is thus at present partly a matter of fact (Community leg_ -i.-
macy under Treaties, etc); for the period ahead, however, it is more a 
question of future choice on the part of member states, subject also to 
the influence of a directly elected European Parliament. In the scheme 
above, the term 'adequate or under negotiation' has been loosely applied 
to certain external (non-defence) activities, and to the market regu-
lation and intervention groups of functions ; these are areas in which the 
Community's legitimacy is already established, or where negotiations 
are at present under way (aid, energy, technical and commercial stan-
dards, fisheries, steel). The less positive rating 'some now, future?' 
is applied to the advanced technology and structural and cyclical policy 
functions, and signifies that the Community has already had some, if 
only fractional, involvement, and that some increase in the degree of 
involvement is conceivable in the future without enormous constitutional 
implications. The third rating designated 'no', covering the defence 
and social and welfare services sectors, means that there are fundamen-
tal political and constitutional reasons which rule out a significant 
Community involvement in the setting of 'pre-federal integration'. 
Under the hypothesis of federation, the 'political homogeneity' crite-
rion is, of course, drastically transformed. Three groups of functions -
defence, advanced technology and structural and cyclical policies -
would be fundamentally affected. The first two economic criteria, how-
ever, are not really changed. 
The application of these criteria to the various headings of expenditure 
may now be considered more systematically. 
4.1.1. General Public Services 
External and defence functions. The main headings here,ranked roughly 
in descending order of the present "legitimacy" of Community level acti-
vity, are: 
- external trade negotiations 
- aid to developing countries 
- political cooperation 
- energy negotiations 
- defence. 
These functions have three major characteristics in common. 
First, if member states pool their efforts at the Community level for 
their dealings with the rest of the world they can profit from a type 
of economy of scale that amounts essentially to bargaining power. The 
terms of trade are improved or more favourable results obtained from 
political negotiations by united action. 50-
In addition there are other more technical kinds of economy of scale 
potentially to be obtained at a Community level of activity: in the 
development aid sector savings in administrative costs for recipient 
and donor through unified policy criteria, in the value of aid received 
through spreading the choices in procurement over a broader area; in 
political cooperation through the pooling of diplomatic representation 
in perhaps a considerable number of smaller countries; and above all 
in the defence sector through investment in common weapon technologies 
(the Eurogroup in NATO is attempting to make progress in this field). 
Secondly, there are major 'externalities' in the benefits from these 
activities. Any member state operating on its own knows that there is a 
high degree to which the result of its efforts will benefit other coun-
tries; it is either impossible, impracticable or undesirable to exclude 
other states from benefitting. Disunited efforts in these circumstances 
will in principle lead either to less effective results, or to less 
than the desirable level of activity in the function. 
Thirdly, there are major and increasing interrelations between these 
blocks of activity, and in these circumstances there are advantages to 
be had from establishing an integrated system of policies. The advantages 
are of two kinds, bargaining power against third parties is further in-
creased, and the scope for agreement through trade-offs across different 
policies by member states becomes wider. 
Of the five categories listed only two involve very substantial direct 
public expenditure, development aid where member states spent 
4.8 billion U.S. dollars in 1974, and defence, where they spent 
39.3 billion U.S. dollars. 
In development aid, the recent Lomé Convention and agreements with 
Mediterranean countries imply a growing Community level share in the 
total aid effort, rising from about 8 % in 1974, to about 13 % in 1975 
and 1976, and prospectively to 20 - 25 % towards the end of the decade 
on the basis of present plans. The German Government has proposed 
further progressive increases in the degree of Community level responsi-
bility for this function. /~12 f 
Progressive development of Community policies in development aid, poli-
tical cooperation and energy negotiation are plausible, and potentially 
profitable for the pre-federal integration phase. As for defence, it is 
difficult to foresee major developments at the European level except 
under the hypothesis of a federal political structure (this concerns 
the supply of the defence service, not selective and ad hoc procurement 
arrangements within the sector which are less demanding politically -
see further below). 51 -
Internal, non-defence, general public services. The main headings here 
are: 
- public administration 
- law and order 
- general research. 
For the first two items here, the degree of Community activity should 
depend entirely upon the actual functional responsibilities which the 
Community itself is given. At any event the Community's administrative 
costs should remain only a small fraction of those of member states. Its 
'law and order' activity should be confined to specialised 'supreme 
court' functions in its areas of competence. By general research is 
meant that which concerns the fundamentals of the physical sciences, as 
well as research in the social sciences and humanities (as opposed to 
applied science in military and commercial fields - discussed under 
other headings). In general research thus defined, there is little case 
for Community involvement on a significant scale. 
4.1.2. Social and welfare services. This concerns sectors covering well 
over half of all public expenditure, and amounting to 20 to 25 % of GDP. 
The principal headings are: 
- education 
- health 
- social security and welfare 
- housing programmes. 
There are in general no significant economy of scale considerations 
favouring European level activity, with some small exceptions, for 
example for specialised fields of medical research. 
In the education sector especially, the member states and regions of the 
Community are strongly attached to national or sub-national traditions 
and preferences; diversity also provides a testing ground for innovation. 
Specific Community interests are relatively limited in the education sec-
tor, for example a high standard of learning of each other's languages in 
schools, the mutual recognition of examination standards, particularly 
for the protected professions (doctors, architects, lawyers, accountants 
etc.). In the health and social security sector reciprocity and non-
discrimination and other technical coordination arrangements are required 
to facilitate the free movement of labour. There are very few cases where 
it can be argued that the Community should be a leading force behind the 
development of social security systems. The social security systems of 
Community member countries are relatively complete, and may be more 
similar to each other than, for example, in the United States where there 
are serious problems of 'laggard' states. In the field of social legis-
lation, however, 'Equal Pay' for men and women provides a recent example 
of Community action. 52-
There is no case for any major Community financial involvement in these 
spending functions as long as two present conditions are maintained: 
(i) the level of inter-member state migration remains relatively slight 
and (ii) the differences in the standard of public services are not so 
great as to constitute a real Community-level political issue. However 
these two conditions are crucial, and one cannot predict how long they 
will hold. The Community's objectives and policies are directed towards 
the day when either or both conditions could cease to prevail. Two deli-
berate steps are currently being taken in this direction: further enlar-
gement to include one or more less developed and migration-prone Medi-
terranean countries, and direct election of the European Parliament, 
which will increase the political sensitivity to differences in stan-
dards in the major public services. A third unintended factor is the 
continued divergence of economic performance between existing member 
states, which means diverging fiscal capacities and ultimately public 
service standards. 
Tendencies towards increased migration between member states will 
affect different categories of the population in different degrees; nor-
mally it is on the one hand the most highly qualified and mobile pro-
fessions (doctors, managers etc.), and on the other hand unskilled 
labour from regions with high unemployment, that are the most migration-
prone groups.For professional categories such as doctors there are 
costly public finance investments involved. The conventional 'fiscal 
federal' solution - to situations in which specific types of migration 
result in 'spillover' losses for the public authorities of the emigra-
tion areas - is through the use of specific purpose grants, where the 
federal grant matches the degree of leakage through migration. 
Where differences in public services and social security benefits become 
a major factor in broader-based migration, and to the extent that there 
is a wish to discourage or reduce this migration, the appropriate remedy 
lies in a combination of general purpose fiscal capacity equalisation 
grants with the financing of regional development programmes. However 
even under these conditions there would not necessarily be an implied 
case for the Community to be involved in the provision of basic public 
services and welfare state functions across the whole Community, nor 
necessarily to be concerned with their detailed implementation in 
states receiving grants. 
4·1·3· Economic Services 
Market intervention functions. The sectors in which the Community is at 
present involved to an important extent are: 
- agricultural produce 
- fisheries 
- steel 
- oil 53 
Good reasons are required to justify, from the economic point of vip", 
direct intervention in the functioning of the market for goods prod 'id 
by the private sector - as opposed to regulation of the general cor, 
tions of trading and competition referred to below. In the case of agri-
culture, the use of budgetary price support policies stems from a long 
history of public intervention, traceable mainly to the short-term vola-
tility of conditions in uncontrolled markets and the desire to maintain 
a degree of self-sufficiency. 
In off-shore fisheries there are inherent dangers of overproduction 
leading to a disastrous depletion of stocks, while it is difficult to 
enforce production limits. These factors imply in theory and practice 
the strong need for public intervention. In addition there is an involve-
ment with non-members of the Community. In this sector the use of pro-
duction quotas or licenses may be appropriate, coupled to structural and 
compensatory measures of a budgetary nature to make the introduction of 
a common policy acceptable. 
In the case of steel, the small number of producers creates a case for 
public intervention; a common system in the Community also provides a 
basis for bargaining with third parties. 
For oil, a minimum price mechanism has been proposed to improve the 
degree of self-sufficiency and, again, provide a basis for bargaining 
with third parties. 
In all these cases, and in other problem sectors such as textiles and 
ship-building, to the extent that there are adequate reasons for public 
intervention in private markets there are also reasons of orderly inter-
national marketing and/or external bargaining strength for these activi-
ties to be conducted at the Community level. These activities seem to be 
possible in the pre-federal integration stage, although there are major 
interests at stake which would be easier to handle in a stronger federal 
political structure. 
As regards the Community's finances, the agricultural and steel sectors 
are already adequately covered by existing powers. Some budgetary impli-
cations have been mentioned for fisheries. In the oil sector a minimum 
price system might produce public revenue, but "this is uncertain in the 
present world market situation. Other possible measures in the energy 
sector are in the research and development field (see next heading), or 
in contributions to the cost of public stock-holding policies (e.g. for 
coal), and in the provision of loan finance for nuclear power and energy 
network investments of Community interest. 
Market regulation functions. The main headings here are: 
- technical, environmental and safety standards in industry, transport, 
etc., 
- aspects of commercial law for companies, intellectual property, 
accounting standards, etc. - 54 
- regulation of financial services 
- competition and public tendering policy 
- aspects of tax harmonisation. 
The general characteristics of these functions is that they involve pub-
lic regulation without any substantial public expenditure implications; 
the case for Community level activity is based on a deepening of the 
common market through maintenance of fair conditions of competition, 
some measures of simplification or standardisation, and some economies 
of scale. 
However, these arguments have no absolute value, and have to be weighed 
against the costs of new Community level activity, which include the 
elimination of national political or cultural preferences and traditions 
(these are particularly important in the tax harmonisation field), and 
the administrative costs of implementation to individuals, businesses 
and governments (the volume of legislation can be enormous). 
The case for Community level activity will often be easiest to establish 
in areas of new or rapidly developing regulatory activity, where the 
sunken costs of existing practises are smallest and traditions also 
least Btrongly valued. Examples include automobile safety, environmental 
policy and inflation accounting. 
In general these are sectors which often permit a quite detailed, item 
by item, approach to the question of Community level activity; where 
there are plausible prima facie reasons for Community involvement, but 
where selectivity is called for in the extent and timing of new initia-
tives. The pace of Community progress in these functions is on the whole 
not BO dependent on the political development of the Community; advances 
are conceivable under the pre-federal or federal hypotheses, and limi-
tations to the extent of harmonised or Community legislation would remain 
in all cases. 
Advanced technology functions. The public sector tends to be involved in 
activities where the costs of research and development are extremely high 
so that private development either would not occur at all, or would in-
volve wasteful duplication, or would result in private monopoly. It is 
also involved where strategic interests are at stake. The main headings 
where these considerations are, or could be, relevant at the Community 
level are: 
- civil nuclear engineering 
- defence research and development 
- civil aeronautics 
- space 
- telecommunications 
- computer science and automation 
- new sourceB of energy 
- medical research. - 55 
It seems, for example, by making comparisons with the United States, 
that in several of these activities there may be some further benefits 
to be exploited in Europe, through a pooling of R & D efforts, and a 
related organisation of production and marketing facilities. Their main 
distinguishing characteristics are (a) political and strategic sensiti-
vity and (b) the 'possibility of exclusion' through secrecy, patents, 
licensing and cooperative arrangements, which means that there will not 
necessarily be major 'spillovers' of costs or benefits to states excluded 
from the activity, (c) the R&D efforts lead to goods whose procurement 
is to a very high degree by governments or public corporations. The 
result has in recent years been a proliferation of ad hoc bilateral or 
multilateral 'club' arrangements, which give some economy of scale bene— 
fite at little cost in terms of national freedom of action. Examples are 
seen in civil nuclear engineering (Eurodif, Urenco uranium enrichment 
clubs), in defence procurement (Jaguar, MRCA combat aircraft), in 
civil aeronautics (Concorde, Airbus), space (European Space Agency, 
which, through its organisation of multiple projects on an à la carte 
basis, is in fact a 'club of clubs'), and telecommunications (European 
Space Agency, Euronet). The principal Community activity at present under 
negotiation is the JET thermonuclear fusion project. 
These seems little doubt that these activities will continue in Europe 
in the future to be organised largely on a multi-national basis; the 
question to evaluate is the economic and political costs and benefits of 
ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation versus integration into the general 
political structure of the Community. 
Under a federation, these activities would gravitate predominantly to 
the Community level. In the pre-federal integration stage it is an open 
question whether the required degree of political homogeneity can be 
organised in the Community. 
The public expenditure implications of these R&D activities are not 
very large, although the ultimate economic implications are much larger. 
Total public R&D spending in the areas here mentioned was about 
3 billion U.S. dollars in 1971» substantial steps in the direction of 
Community level activity would be measured in terms of hundreds rather 
than billions of units of account passing through the Community's 
finances. 
Structural and cyclical functions /~12 /· These concern: 
- regional policies, broadly defined to cover employment or investment 
incentives, public infrastructure, and urban redevelopment programmes 
(within designated regions); 
- manpower, employment and unemployment policies, broadly defined to 
cover adult vocational training and retraining, labour mobility, job 
creation or maintenance; 
- unemployment compensation. 56 -
Regional policy expenditure in the Community in 1974» on a narrow defi-
nition including regional capital subventions, interest rate rebates, 
employment premiums and fiscal investment incentives, is estimated to 
have amounted to 3.5 billion U.S. dollars. This excludes much public 
infrastructure expenditure in the designated regions (for example roads), 
urban redevelopment programmes, and, in the case of Germany, special 
aids to Berlin. On a broader definition, the total could well be around 
twice as large - in the region of 7 billion U.S. dollars. The Community's 
Regional Fund at present (1976, 1977) operates on an annual allocation 
of 65O million U.S. dollars. 
Manpower and employment policy programmes, including vocational training 
(outside the formal education system), temporary employment maintainance 
or creation, geographic mobility, public employment services, and aids 
for the training and employment of handicapped persons is estimated in 
1975 to have amounted to 6.6 billion U.S. dollare in the five member 
states where the statistics are best. Taking into account the relative 
weight of other member states, total expenditure in the Community pro-
bably amounted to around 7·5 billion U.S. dollars. The Community Social 
Fund's allocation for 1976 was 620 million U.S. dollars, all however 
devoted to vocational training, since the Fund is not authorised to 
intervene in other types of manpower and employment policy. 
Unemployment insurance benefits paid in 1975 in "the Community are esti-
mated to have totalled about 11 billion U.S. dollars. Community parti-
cipation in the financing of unemployment compensation was proposed in 
the 'Marjolin Report', under a scheme whereby the Community would pay 
2 units of account per day per unemployed. Applied to the unemployment 
situation of 1975» this would have led to Community expenditure of 
3.4 billion U.S. dollars which, as a share of total benefits paid in 
each state, would range, from the highest to lowest income states, from 
33 i to 85 <%. 
There are possibilities in these three areas for partial Community 
financing. This would leave member states responsible for the operation 
of the policies subject to broad framework agreements at the Community 
level. 
4.2. Stabilisation policy 
The Group has reflected on whether in the period ahead there is a plau-
sible role at the Community level, beyond the important subject of 
coordination of national macroeconomic policies, for fiscal stabili-
sation policy; stabilisation here meaning the control of short-term 
and cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. 
The prima facie case for an increasing Community involvement in the 
general regulation of economic activity is based on the increasing 
inter-dependence of national economies, through increasing trade, 
capital flows, and internationally transmitted inflation. The more open - 57 -
the economies of member states become in all these respects, the less 
effective national instruments of economic policy become. Multiplier 
effects on internal demand of tax or expenditure changée are dampened 
by a high propensity to import. The presumed remedy is to pursue the 
objectives at a 'higher' level of government with a broader jurisdiction 
encompassing major spillover or leakage effects, either through coordi-
nation or direct fiscal action. /~10 / 
However, any proposal for direct fiscal action for this purpose at the 
Community level encounters two major issues, the inter-relation with 
monetary policy, and the question how to achieve adequate scale of 
operation. 
There ÌB a close and necessary connection between fiscal and monetary 
stabilisation policy in any economy, and this would be true also at the 
Community level /~15 7· There are major links between the public sector 
deficit and its financing on the one hand and the external balance on 
the other. Because of its monetary repercussions, the harmonisation of 
budgetary policies between member countries, in particular of public 
sector deficits and borrowing requirements, has an important role to 
play in assuring a consistent pattern of intra-Community current account 
balances and capital flows. In this sense a Community fiscal stabili-
sation policy is a key element in any programme for European monetary 
integration. At the same time the link between fiscal and monetary stabi-
lisation policy implies that proposals for fiscal anti-cyclical actions 
at the Community level will become fully effective only to the extent 
that it will be supported by a Community control over monetary con-
ditions. 
It is hard to envisage the adequate debt financing power and mechanisms 
which a Community anti-cyclical budgetary policy would require, in a 
framework where control of monetary policy and access to the member 
states' capital markets are jealously guarded national prerogatives. 
As to the question of critical scale of fiscal action, the small size 
of the Community budget in the 'status quo' and 'pre-federal' stage im-
plies that in order to have a perceptible macroeconomic effect on the 
Community economy as a whole, the budget balance would have to swing 
by enormous percentage fractions of this budget - e.g. 50 %· 
On the expenditure side, the functions that exist, or are envisaged for 
the 'pre—federal integration' period, would not lend themselves to 
massive cyclical manipulation of this order. 
On the revenue side, a more intriguing possibility could be seen in a 
further development of the VAT, whereby the Community's rate would be 
'piggy-backed' onto national rates and so become a truly independent 
fiscal instrument /J~10 /, rather than, as under present plans, sub-
sumed in the national rate so far as the individual consumer is con-
cerned. The introduction of a 'piggy-back' scheme would also imply the 
need for some Community approach to the question of VAT rates by product 
groups, as well as the base (which is all that is being harmonised at 58-
present). This would also be a positive factor in making the budgetary 
authorities - Council and Parliament - directly responsible to the tax 
payer /~17 7·
 Tn
e Community rate might then be modulated for fiscal 
stabilisation purposes, with the resulting budget balance financed by 
Community debt issues. However, this would imply massive swings in the 
degree to which budget expenditure was covered by VAT or debt. While 
this idea has a certain logical appeal, the Group would not wish to 
promote it as an operational proposal for the foreseeable future. The 
main reason, apart from considerations already raised, is essentially a 
political one. Member states have in recent years experienced difficul-
ties in keeping Keynesian deficit financing under control; it would seem 
inopportune to propose that a new tier of government be given by design 
an unprecedently wide potential margin of contra-cyclical budgetary 
imbalance. 
Already in the context of more limited ambitions, however, there are 
several functions the Community should consider: 
(a) limited borrowing powers (for relatively short periods) to avoid 
a pro-cyclical influence from the budget, and to 'lean in the right 
direction' so far as the general thrust of coordinated national 
conjunctural policies is concerned; 
(b) operation of certain financial grant instruments that would help 
even out business cycle conditions across the Community and begin 
to establish the kind of inter-regional cyclical financial solida-
rity that is typical of integrated modern economies i 
As regards borrowing powers, the Community already operates as a finan-
cial intermediary in several capacities (for the Community Loan, Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, European Investment Bank) and there are 
further Commission proposals under negotiation in the Council (Euratom 
loans for nuclear power stations, European Export Bank). There is a 
further case for borrowing and lending powers for a broader sectoral 
range of industrial development and redevelopment, as well as for an 
expanded use of the Community Loan facility for balance of payments or 
general financing purposes. To these borrowing powers might be added 
general budget loan powers either to meet short-term cash management 
needs or to 'lean in the right direction' for Community stabilisation 
through a net borrowing or lending position - without, however, seeking 
to exercise a major corrective influence. 
It would then be worth considering the establishment of an agency or 
common organisation to serve for financial intermediation purposes, 
which would be controlled alongside the general budget of the Community 
by the same political processes. This organisation would manage 
borrowing and lending operations to support the specific objectives of 
various individual loan powers, and the general objective of cyclical 
policy, as well as other Community objectives such as the integration 
of capital markets. -59-
As regards grant instruments relevant for cyclical stabilisation, a pos-
sible Community participation in the financing of unemployment benefits 
(as already outlined above) is of clear importance here. The idea 
advanced in the Marjolin Report was that this should be a field in which 
the Community would have direct contact with the individual citizen, 
thus providing at least one major (and attractive) exception to the 
general principle that the Community's finances would in ajpre-federal 
period mainly involve intergovernmental transactions 
. in a pi 
As f. 
Moving one step up the hierarchy of inter-governmental finance, another 
instrument worth considering would be something Bimilar to the recent 
U.S. proposal for cyclical general purpose local government grants, 
related to regional unemployment level and trend indicators. In the 
Community case this might be an automatic mechanism obeying quantified 
criteria (e.g. regional GDP per capita and regional unemployment trends). 
An advantage of dealing with regions rather than whole member states is 
that it avoids taking the large member states in their totality; but 
the grants would, presumably, have to be related to member states' local 
government financing systems, which would raise some further problems. 
Alternatively, and for operation at the level of the member state, the 
Community might establish a 'conjunctural convergence facility' to 
extend grant finance to economically weak member states in particularly 
difficult economic situations, taking into account the extent to which 
the member state was or was not prospering in the course of trade and 
competition in the Community, and according to the circumstances subject 
to negotiated economic policy or performance conditions. 
4·3. Redistribution 
It has already been suggested that during the pre-federal and also the 
small public sector federation phase the Community is more likely to 
achieve significant redistribution by transfers between member states 
than through Community taxes and social security systems that deal 
directly with the individual. The scope for such transfers, however, is 
in part a question of evident political preference; the individuals of 
member states and their governments simply do not want to transfer 
powers over 'internal' income distribution issues to the Community. It 
is also a matter of economic principles, since transfers between 
member states can satisfy specific Community needs, notably to keep 
the Community together during the integration process, whereas the case 
(generally argued in the literature of 'fiscal federalism') for 
discharging the inter—personal redistribution function at the 'top' 
level of government depends essentially on a high level of geographic 
mobility of the individual, which is not at present the Community 
situation /~10 /, /J~13 7--60-
The need for redistribution between member states arises partly because 
the process of economic integration, which may confer net gains in the 
aggregate, does not necessarily raise the economic welfare in all 
areas. The changing pattern of production and exchange that characte­
rizes an integrating Community typically brings gains to some but 
losses to others. To make integration acceptable to all participants 
may thus require an explicit redistributive mechanism to divide the 
gains from integration in a politically acceptable way. Failure to 
attend to this matter may at the least result in a stagnation of the 
integration process, and at the worst result in secession and disso­
lution. Economic analysis can give an analytical framework and point 
to the techniques that may best match the objectives and circumstances 
in question. Only the political system, however, can in the last analysis 
prescribe what should be done. 
The scale and pattern of redistribution can be defined technically in 
terms of the scale and pattern of financial flows. As to the scale of 
redistribution, the Group has made use of a standard measure of the 
redistributive power of inter-regional flows of public finance Γ5_7· 
This measures the extent to which such flows of public finance change 
the average per capita income positions of regions or states in 
relation to each other. In brief, the 'redistributive power* of inter­
regional transfers would be 100 % if the effect of such transfers was 
completely to equalise regional or state per capita average incomes; 
the 'redistributive power' would be 50 7> if the transfers halved average 
per capita income differentials. 
Using this measure, the Group has done some simulations in the present 
Community setting /~14 7, to demonstrate the pattern of inter-member 
state transfers that would correspond approximately to what may be 
observed as between the regions of the fully integrated economies 
studied (as already described above) and to show what kind of budgetary 
mechanisms could generate these transfers. This in the first instance is 
merely to illustrate the extreme hypothesis of the Community as a 
maturely integrated economy; more limited variants are discussed later. 
The country case studies suggested that the average redistributive power 
of central or federal public finance was such as to achieve a 40 per cent 
equalisation of regional or state primary income differentials. Among the 
numerous simulations set out in Chapter /~14 7» there is one which may 
here be briefly described to give an idea of~what a 40 per cent redistri­
butive power in the Community could involve. It is assumed that a 
horizontal budget equalisation mechanism (of the type used in Germany 
in inter-Lander equalisation - Finanzausgleich) is used to raise the per 
capita fiscal capacity of the economically weaker member states in the 
Community up to a minimum of 95 % of the Community average. This would 
in 1975 have entailed transfers totalling 20 billion units of account 
or 2 % of Community GDP. The receiving states would have been Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, the paying states being the remaining six 
member states. (These calculations are made with reference to purchasing 61 
power parity differences in fiscal capacity between member states, not 
market exchange rates: to use current market exchange rates would ir 
increase the transfers.) 
Under this hypothesis, with the redistribution process reduced to pure 
net transfer terms (i.e. not combined with payments to particular 
sectors of the economy throughout the Community), a very high-powered 
effect is obtained in relation to the expenditure involved. Transfers 
amounting to 2 fo of Community GDP, apart from equalising inter-member 
state incomes to the extent of 4O %, would have financed a large part 
or all of the current balance of payments deficits of the beneficiary 
states in the year in question. Thus very significant macroeconomic 
effects would have been achieved by expenditure amounting to about 
three times the actual size of the Community budget. It should be 
stressed that this degree of redistribution corresponds to that which 
is produced by the public finance system of a federation. 
The Community's present finances achieve, by contrast, only a very small 
redistribution. Expressed in the same terms as the foregoing example, 
the Community's budget in 1975 is estimated to have had a 1 % redistri-
butive power, i.e. one-fortieth of the average found in maturely inte-
grated economies /~14 /· The budget expenditure totalled 6.6 billion 
u.a. in this year; its weak redistributive power, per unit of account, 
in relation to the preceding example reflects the fact that the agri-
cultural fund has specific sectoral objectives, with only an incidental 
inter-member state redistributive effect (of -§■ of 1 % 'redistributive 
power*). The Regional and Social Funds have more explictly redistributive 
purposes, but since their expenditure commitments are each only about 
one-tenth of those of the agricultural fund, they achieve redistributive 
powers of only about 1/4 of 1 % each. 
The question then is, where between these two extremes should one expect 
the Community to be moving in the course of a pre-federal integration 
phase? Can the range of possibilities be plausibly narrowed down? One 
way of approaching this extremely difficult question is to reconsider 
the reasons why inter-regional redistribution takes place on such a 
large scale in maturely integrated economies, and note how many of these 
factors are at present relevant in the Community. 
Inter-regional redistribution produces a reasonably equitable sharing of 
both the cyclical and secular fortunes of an economic union, and thereby 
helps to maintain its political unity; it helps as far as possible 
attainment of comparable economic performance between regions; it com-
pensates for the inability of regions or states to use trade or exchange 
rate policies in the management of their economies, and it limits the 
extent to which migration has to serve as part of the economic adjust-
ment process. In all mature federal states, on the other hand, the 
counterpart of these powerful equalisation mechanisms is a mature poli-
tical structure with a federal government and parliament and other 
federal agencies. - 62 
The considerations that, prima facie, work in favour of an emphasis on 
redistribution between the member states of the Community are: 
(a) The explicit political objective of convergent economic performance 
and reduction in the backwardness of less favoured regions. Within 
the limits of the pre-federal Community expenditure that is 
envisaged, it seems likely that this can best be provided by grants 
for such specific purposes as regional and manpower policies in the 
weaker areas. 
(b) The desirability of avoiding an excessive level of general migra-
tion from the poorer areas. The areas in question are of limited 
size at present, but the accession to membership of e.g. Greece 
and Portugal would add substantially to this problem. The best 
policy for dealing with it is probably a selective one of specific 
purpose grants, as in (a), rather than wider redistributive 
measures. 
(c) The desirability of avoiding excessive migration of more mobile, 
highly trained, manpower from those countries where their net 
earnings are substantially lower than elsewhere. This is primariliy 
a matter of pay and tax structure in the countries concerned rather 
than a ground for major international aid. 
(d) The danger that, as economic integration proceeds, there will be 
increasing pressure from wage-earners for real earnings equal to 
those in the richer member countries, regardless of the remaining 
international differences in productivity. This is a serious danger, 
which could weaken the competitive power of the poorer countries 
and/or promote rapid inflation in them. Once again, however, inter-
national transfers within the expenditure total envisaged for the 
pre-federal stage could make a substantial contribution to its 
solution only in so far as they could be channelled into specific 
schemes for improving productivity. The main hope in anything but 
the long-run must lie in adequate senses of economic realism among 
wage-earners in those countries where productivity, for various 
reasons, lags behind the more advanced national levels. 
(e) The creation of a degree of convergence in productivity levels, and 
of automatic compensation for short-term relative changes in income, 
which would facilitate progress towards monetary union. We do not 
think, however, that the extent to which convergence and compen-
sation could be promoted by Community expenditure on the scale that 
we are assuming for the pre-federal integration stage could, in any 
case, be adequate to make major progress towards monetary union 
practicable, and we regard thiB as an objective for a later stage, 
not for the immediate future. -63-
There is thus a case for further redistributive Community expenditure, 
but it must be qualified in the various ways just enumerated. Moreo ·, 
political expectations in the Community today are concerned more wi' 
help to economically weaker member states with the acute economic 
problems of the day (unemployment, trade and exchange rate and public 
finance problems) than with an equalisation (through transfers) of 
longer-run differences in living standards as such. The Community is 
expected to have a responsibility for the dynamic effects of economic 
integration and for measures to compensate for the absence of national 
trade policies. It has also a strong interest in each member state 
conducting its macroeconomic policies in ways that do not have ill 
effects on other member states (especially as regards trade, inflation 
and international monetary policies). 
This suggests that, in the pre-federal stage, a large part of the pay-
ments made to member states is likely to be conditional. Unconditional 
horizontal redistribution between states which achieves the highest 
'redistributive power' per unit of expenditure would seem to be not so 
appropriate for use on any large scale in a setting of 'pre-federal 
integration' stage; its natural place is in a federation with a small 
'top' level public sector. 
The constraints to which financial redistribution in the 'pre-federal 
integration' stage might be subjected are: 
- links to specific purposes, such as regional and manpower policies 
aimed at improving the economic capacity, employment situation and 
competitive power of weaker regions, (rather than simply enhancing 
their consumption); 
- links to economic criteria reflecting the relative cyclical as well 
as structural economic situation of member states; 
- links to economic policy performance in areas over which member states 
have some control and which are of consequence to the economic stability 
of the Community as a whole. 
Conditional transfers are likely to be less efficient than unconditional 
as instruments of redistribution, because it is improbable that all the 
recipients of benefit will be in the poorer countries. This, however, 
merely reflects the fact that the simultaneous pursuit of more than one 
objective requires compromise solutions. The result is that the 
redistributive power of the extra expenditure most appropriate for the 
Community in the pre-federal integration period is likely to be sub-
stantially smaller than the maximum that could be attained if the same 
amount of spending took the form solely of unconditional net transfers 
from richer to poorer member countries. 
There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which some limited uncondi-
tional redistribution may be called for. For example, the Community 
might establish a fiscal equalisation mechanism, having the structure 
of typical federal equalisation mechanisms, but setting an unusually -64-
low minimum standard of, say, 65 % of the Community average fiscal 
capacity. Such a system might be intended to assure to poor, small and 
peripheral member states economic, welfare and public service standards 
not too far below those of the main body of the Community. For prospec-
tive member states it could serve to provide some general financial 
underpinning for the economic risks of joining the customs union. 
4.4· Financing ^~16_7 
The Council decision of December 1976, agreeing the common VAT base 
(with certain temporary derogations) means that on 1st January 1978 the 
Community will be giving full effect to the Own Resources decision of 
I97O, according to which the Community's budget will be financed first 
by customs duties and agricultural levies and, then, by a share of the 
VAT not exceeding 1 % on the common base. Being indirect taxes, these 
revenue sources tend to have a somewhat regressive incidence, but this 
distributive problem has broadly speaking been dealt with by the 
'Financial Mechanism', which reimburses to economically weaker member 
states, in certain circumstances and in a certain degree, the excess of 
their share in total Own Resource payments over their share in Community 
GNP; this puts the Own Resource system onto an approximately neutral 
basis from the distributive stand-point. 
The maximum available Own Resources on this basis is forecast to amount 
to about 11 -|- billion units of account in 1978 (at 1976 prices). 
Community budget expenditure is forecast to be 9«7 billion units of 
account in 1978. Taking into account the intended future budgétisation 
of certain development aid expenditure, the possible budgetary conse-
quences of enlargement with Greece, and various other items, it seems 
probable that the Community will approach the limit of its existing 
financial capacity towards the end of the decade without assuming any 
major new policy developments with budgetary implications. 
The Group has therefore considered what the Community's next resources 
might consist of, having in mind the expenditure implications of the 
foregoing analysis. A working hypothesis is that the Community might 
need two to three times its present financial capacity in the 'pre-
federal integration' stage. Potential revenue sources have to be 
evaluated by several criteria, notably their yield, their distributive 
characteristics and their economic functions, as well as administrative 
and political considerations. 
As indicated above, there is in the experience of federations no tax of 
a relevant size that is an obvious candidate for total transfer to the 
Community in the way that was true for customs duties. 
There are several types of existing or potential taxes with economic 
functions relevant to the Community: a contribution based on payrolls 
in the event of a Community participation in unemployment benefits; an - 65 
oil import levy in the event of a minimum oil price mechanism; or 
various types of excises or levies on agricultural produce subject to 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
There is also a logical case to be made for a fiscal complement to the 
Community's Regional Fund subsidies. This could, for example, take the 
form of a tax on new investment in regions fulfilling criteria that were 
the inverse of those used for eligibility for regional aids (e.g. 
centrally located agglomerations with labour shortages, high income 
levels, high levels of congestion, etc.). 
None of the foregoing examples, although each has a functional logic of 
its own, can be seen as sufficiently large-scale and regular sources of 
Community revenue. 
As regards future revenue sources, an increase in the 1 <f0 VAT limit on 
members* contributions (adjusted by the "Financial Mechanism") would be 
the easiest idea from an institutional and administrative point of view. 
It would not, however, in itself assist redistribution from the revenue 
(as opposed to the expenditure) side. For that a progressive revenue 
source is required. The most obvious such sources are personal and 
corporate income taxes. However, the problems of the Community moving 
into either of these fielde for revenue purposes would be enormous. 
Without here going into these questions, the Group feels that corporation 
tax would probably only be a plausible candidate for a Community tax 
overlapping or sharing arrangement under the hypothesis of federation; 
a Community participation in personal income tax would be an even more 
difficult proposition. 
Alternative sources of progressive finance could be a personal income tax 
capacity key /~14 7< which could, technically, be based on the methods 
of tax capacixy estimation used in certain budget equalisation systems 
(e.g. Canada). A variant could be built onto the VAT system, with adjust-
ments for redistributive purposes made on the basis of a formula using 
a given progressivity key, such as personal income tax capacity (l); 
this would mean a system of the 'redistributive tax-sharing* variety, 
somewhat akin to that used in Germany for distributing between Länder 
their share of VAT revenue. 
(l) Alternatively, average GNP per head could be used in such a system. 
The adjusted VAT contribution at present is proportional, as between 
member states to n jr where n is population and y_ average GNP per 
head in the country concerned. Progressiveness could be introduced 
by, for instance, substituting n y_ â where â is above unity. -66-
As a general system for the period ahead, there would be advantages in 
having open at the same time two marginal sources of finance: first a 
neutral tranche of VAT resources, and secondly a progressive revenue 
source. The purpose would be to allow the redistributive power of the 
system to be adjusted from the revenue side from time to time without 
opening up the whole question of the basis of VAT contributions. 
4.5« General financial and budgetary perspectives 
The object of this section is to draw together the main implications 
of the above discussion for the future development of the Community 
expenditure under the hypothesis of, firstly, a period of pre-federal 
integration and, secondly, a small public sector federation. For this 
purpose the main heads of expenditure are briefly reviewed and the 
redistributive power of various conceivable packages is indicated, to-
gether with their gross expenditure implications. It will be recalled 
that the Community's budget expenditure in 1977 is a little over 
10 billion budget units of account, or OJ ^ of Community GDP (l). 
Pre-federal integration. Under 'general public services' the main area 
for potential increases in expenditure within the pre-federal hypothesis 
is development aid, where 2 to 4 billion u.a. further straight transfers 
from national to Community level are conceivable. Increased expenditure 
for general administration and research are likely, but not in macroeco-
nomi cally significant amounts. The defence sector, which at present 
costs some 4O billion u.a., only features under the federal hypothesis. 
Under 'social and welfare services' the Group does not foresee the 
Community taking over macroeconomically significant blocks of expenditure 
functions, with certain exceptions and qualifications. The exceptions are 
unemployment benefits and vocational training, but these are viewed as 
cyclical and structural economic services - see below. The qualifica-
tions are that the Community may find itself at some stage involved in 
budget equalisation arrangements, whereby general purpose grants would 
be made to the weakest member states to be used indirectly for aiding 
the attainment of certain general public service standards. Under the 
federal hypothesis, mechanisms of this type could become highly probable. 
According to simulations set out elsewhere /~14_7» such mechanisms could 
be expected to lead to grants amounting to several billion u.a. per 
annum. During the pre-federal integration period, however, mechanisms 
of this type on any comprehensive or general scale would seem constitu-
tionally premature. The need for more limited general purpose grants may 
still arise during the pre-federal integration period, and this also is 
further mentioned below. 
(l) See Table 8. One billion budget units of account (u.a.) corresponds 
to about 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (at average I976 exchange rates). - 67 
Under 'economic services' the Community should, in the view of the Group, 
face the prospect of a rather complex pattern of partial - and occa-
sionally total - financial responsibility for quite a number of headings. 
In the area of agricultural market price support the high present level 
of expenditure (6.5 billion u.a.) reflects the financing of some 
structural product surpluses (e.g. milk) and of price differentials 
between countries (through the monetary compensatory amounts system). 
Savings from this level could be expected from a better structural 
supply-demand relationship for some products, and through the achievement 
of greater monetary stability which is in turn dependent on a greater 
convergence of real economic performance between member states. The 
latter, however, depends on the adequacy of the Community's role in the 
area of general economic policy to which other parts of this report are 
addressed. At all events, this is not an area where the Group expects 
important growth of expenditure. 
In other industrial sectors for which Community intervention is 
established or plausible (steel, fisheries, energy, advanced technology 
industries, declining industries such as textiles and ship building 
etc) the amounts of direct budgetary subsidies should not become very 
large. Sectoral programmes in the area of tens or hundreds of millions 
u.a. - rather than billions - may be expected. Much larger sums of 
parallel loan financing, borrowed by the Community on capital markets 
or borrowed under Community guarantee, would seem to be indicated for 
aiding investment and industrial reconversion activities in problem 
sectors where a Community-level solution is needed. However these loan 
financing operations, with the Community acting as a financial inter-
mediary, are not to be confused with budgetary expenditure. The latter 
may supply, however, interest-rate subsidies on the former. Such subsi-
dies may be expected, according to circumstances, to come either from 
sector-specific programmes (e.g. as already in the Coal and Steel 
Community) or by drawing on more general structural subsidies where 
appropriate (e.g. from the Regional Fund). Here, again, the prospects 
of growth are moderate rather than large. 
It is in the area of structural, cyclical, employment and regional poli-
cies that the Group sees the main need for macroeconomically significant 
expenditure at the Community level. Here there are a number of possibi-
lities that have to be considered as substitutes, depending upon detailed 
practical (in part institutional) considerations which it is not for this 
Group to seek to determine. Three fairly clear-cut possibilities arise in 
the fields of (a) regional policy aids, (b) labour market policies, and 
(c) unemployment compensation. Member States are estimated to be spending 
from 5 to 9 billion u.a. per annum on each of these three headings, where-
as the Community's contribution is around -g- billion u.a. on regional and 
labour market policies and nothing on unemployment compensation. The Group 
considers that one option the Community should contemplate during the 
pre-federal integration period would be to raise the degree of Community 
financial participation in each of these fields to somewhere in the region 
of a third. This would entail major reforms and extensions in the inter-
vention criteria for the Regional and Social Funds; the unemployment com-
pensation idea also has major implications of policy and practical natures. - 68 
The regional and labour market expenditure would be intended to raise 
aggregate expenditure under these headings above all in the economically 
weaker parts of the Community. The unemployment compensation would not 
be intended to increase unemployment benefit levels: its objective would 
be that of introducing an element of visible and real financial soli-
darity between the individual members of the labour force across the 
Community,and like the other two measures, it would have considerable 
inter-member state redistributive, resource transfer, and balance of 
payments implications. 
Three further ideas, which are partly related to the objectives of the 
preceding three possibilities, have been mentioned in the report, which 
are: (a) a limited budget equalisation scheme for extremely weak member 
states, (b) a system of cyclical grants to the local or regional govern-
ment level that would depend upon regional economic conditions, and 
(c) a conjunctural convergence facility that would make available grant 
finance to member states in packages of Community finance aimed at 
preventing acute cyclical problems of weak member states leading to 
increasingly divergent structural gaps between states. These three 
suggestions are to a high degree· substitutable. They differ, of course, 
but the Group would not envisage all being introduced. The general 
characteristic of these suggestions is that the funds would be less 
specifically tied to narrow programmes of permanent public expenditure, 
and therefore more capable of responding to the urgent needs of the 
general economic situation and of being applied flexibly in relation to 
macroeconomic policy criteria or performance indicators. These characte-
ristics would be intended to make the instruments helpful in pursuing 
the objective of economic convergence in the Community. 
One cannot be at all precise as to the total amounts of Community expen-
diture implied by these suggestions under the structural, cyclical, 
employment, and regional headings, except to give very rough orders of 
magnitude at which the instruments in question could be expected to 
have a material impact on the objectives in question. If the general 
objective was to concentrate a selection of such instruments to a large 
extent on the problems of the weaker regions or states (covering not 
more than twenty, or at the outside, thirty per cent of the Community's 
population at any one time), then budgetary expenditure of the order of 
5 to 10 billion u.a. per annum could be regarded as beginning to be 
economically really significant - especially if a further induced supply 
of loan finance from capital markets was achieved, as might be reasonably 
expected. The choice between the six types of instrument, and of their 
relative weighting in financial terms, is in the view of the Group a 
very open matter, and has to depend upon the detailed consideration of 
many political, economic, and administrative considerations. 
As to redistributive power, expenditure of, say, 10 billion u.a. on a 
selection of the foregoing six instruments could - if concentrated rather 
heavily on the weakest member states and regions - result in an equali-
sation of about 10 % of existing income per capita differentials between 
member states (measured at purchasing power parity exchange rates); -69-
i.e. this would be about one-quarter of the average degree of equali-
sation observed to take place in the fully integrated economies studied. 
This is small in comparison with that which would probably be required 
to render full economic and monetary integration acceptable; but it 
would be an acceptable start. 
The implications for net aggregate public expenditure in the Community 
as a share of GNP are quite limited. Expenditure under some headings 
would be essentially transfers from national to Community levels (as 
for development aid, industrial policy, fisheries, energy, unemployment 
compensation). In some areas (for example, advanced technologies) real 
economies would in fact be the principal reason for a transfer to the 
Community level. Savings should be aimed for in agriculture. As regards 
regional, labour market, and cyclical and general purpose budgetary 
transfers, a principal objective of these programmes would to be even 
out demand pressures and resource utilisation in the Community economy 
as a whole, and so induce an increase in real Community GNP. 
Small public sector federation. The Group can envisage a rather novel 
'high-powered' budget model for the Community which would aim at the 
specific needs of economic, monetary and political union. This model 
would be 'high-powered' in the sense of fulfilling to a high degree the 
redistributive and macroeconomic policy functions that are to be 
expected of a union, but which at the same time aims at minimum Community 
level public expenditure - i.e. a minimum centralisation in the supply 
of goods and services. The contents of this model are now described: it 
will be noted that the 'high-powered' effects are achieved because the 
budget operates to a high degree through net resource transfers, or 
through subsidies that are designated to have a high leverage effect 
on national expenditures and on capital flows. 
The main functions in this budget model are described with reference to 
the nomenclature, and financial orders of magnitude for the Community, 
given in Table 7. Community expenditure under 'social and welfare 
services' would remain very limited, and here in fact would lie the 
major difference with the large public sector federation (which covers 
all the existing federations studied). Of the 23 % of GDP devoted to such 
services the Group would envisage Community expenditure of not more 
than 1 -g- to 2 % of GDP. The largest component would be a general purpose 
equalisation mechanism making transfers to the weakest member states 
for them to top up their own budget efforts; there would also be specific 
expenditure on unemployment and perhaps some kinds of housing expenditure 
in the context of urban redevelopment programmes. Under 'economic ser-
vices' the Community's involvement in structural and sectoral actions 
(agriculture, energy, public infrastructure, industrial, regional and 
labour market policies) would be extensive, but even so might not account 
for expenditure of more than 2 to 3 $ of GDP (half or less of all expen-
diture under these headings), since the Community's policies would aim 
here again at complementing member states* actions, and boosting the -70-
efforts of weakest member states in particular. As regards 'general 
public services', the Community's share of expenditure on public admini-
stration, law and order would remain quite small. The Community would, 
however, account for all foreign aid expenditure (0.7 % of GDP) and 
defence (of 2 -§■ to 3 % of GDP), and a sizeable part of all research 
expenditure (say \ % of GDP). Total civil expenditure might then range 
from 5 to 7 % of GDP. Including defence, total public expenditure would 
amount to 7 I to 10 ƒ» of GDP. 
In order for this budget model to be capable of sustaining an economic 
and monetary union, the transfers and expenditure under the budget equa-
lisation mechanism for 'social and welfare services' and 'economic ser-
vices' would have to be not only strongly redistributive, but also 
capable of a sensitive and large-scale response to short-term changes in 
the economic fortunes of regions and states. Simulations made by the 
Group </""l4 7 suggest that the budget of the small public sector 
federation
-could attain the standards of redistributive power seen 
elsewhere in fully integrated economies (e.g. equalising up to 40 70 of 
per capita regional income differentials), but the technical design of 
the budgetary instruments to do this would have to be strongly and 
deliberately biased in favour of these objectives. 
4.6. Principles for the Community's financial instruments 
An expansion of the Community's grant and loan facilities, as envisaged 
in this report, makes essential the proper technical design of the 
financial instruments in relation to their objectives, and the formu-
lation of a coherent overall financial policy. Questions of financial 
technique are particularly important when - as in the Community case -
there is a mix of structural and redistributive objectives. 
The main issues here concern (a) the use of fixed money amount allocations 
by country versus matching funds offering more or less 'open-ended' 
financial incentives, or funds that can be managed with some flexibility 
of response to changing priorities; (b) the use of uniform or variable 
matching ratios in the Community's financial contribution under grant 
programmes; and (c) the links between grant funds (such as the Regional 
and Social Funds) and loan funds (such as through the ECSC and the EIB 
and the Community Loan). 
The Community's present financial instruments contain a variety of 
practices. The Regional Fund administers quotas which are fixed sums per 
member state, the Social Fund has a system of priority allocation of its 
global budgetary attribution, while the FEOGA Guidance Section's instru-
ments are moving from a system of fixed sum allocations to one based on 
open-ended matching grants. As to matching ratios, the Regional and 
Social Funds apply more or less uniform rates as between countries or 
regions, while the FEOGA Guidance Section has begun to make use of 
variable matching ratios. As to links between grant and loan funds, the - 71 -
ECSC's current income from levies is used actively for subsidising 
interest rates for loan finance raised by the ECSC on capital markets, 
and used for industrial redevelopment. The Regional Fund is empowered to 
operate similarly in conjunction with EIB loan finance, but the use of 
this facility is impeded by the Fund's small size and fixed quota allo-
cations. Moreover EIB lending to the private sector of member states with 
weak currencies is at present impeded because of heavy exchange risks 
for borrowers where these are not covered by national governments. 
Principles that would seem to be indicated for the Community in its 
present or envisaged functions are: 
- fixed sum quotas by country or region should be avoided except for 
grants that are intended to be for general financial purposes; the use 
of quotas for specific purpose funds will tend to entail some contra-
diction, since unless the Community has powers over national expendi-
tures (which it will normally not have) the recipient government will 
in effect be able to treat the funds as fungible general purpose 
grants: this is relevant to the Regional Fund and to much of past expen-
diture under the Guidance section of FEOGA (notably the 'individual 
projects' under Regulation I7/64). 
- where it is intended that the grants should encourage recipient govern-
ments to increase their expenditure efforts in the sector in question, 
as is the case for the Regional and Social Funds, there should be some 
at least partially open-ended commitment under which the Community 
would match the recipients' increased efforts. The Community's finan-
cial commitment may still be limited in various ways,for example in 
certain regions, or through the use of priority criteria with overall 
financial limits. 
- as regards matching ratios, there is a plausible case - in the interest 
of obtaining the greatest effect from very limited resources - for the 
use of variable ratios, ranging, for example, from 20 to 80 %, or 30 
to 70 %. The Community matching ratio would be highest in member states 
with the weakest fiscal capacity and for projects or regions of highest 
need; and vice versa for the lowest matching ratio. Uniform matching 
ratios are more appropriate where there exists a budget equalisation 
system, which ÌB another way of countering the problem of divergent 
fiscal capacity, or where member states are of similar fiscal capacity; 
but these conditions do not reflect the Community situation. 
- Community grant funds, for example the Regional Fund, and, possibly, 
allotments from the suggested 'conjunctural convergence facility', 
should be enabled to operate in conjunction with Community loan faci-
lities (ECSC, EIB, and Community Loan). This would increase the finan-
cial leverage of the grant funds, and enable the loan resources to be 
tapped in circumstances in which they would otherwise be blocked 
because of inflexibly commercial terms. -72-
Finally, there is an important question of institutions and procedures. 
The difficult economic and political issues involved in deciding on 
inter-governmental grant policies cannot easily be resolved within closed 
circles of experts, or of officials, or even ministers. They require a 
particularly large amount of public debate and high degree of political 
consensus, especially in the event of grant instruments with redistri-
butive characteristics. In this connection the Community could possibly 
profit from the experience of some specialised institutions developed in 
the United States (notably the Advisory Commission on Inter-Governmental 
Relations) and the Australian Grants Commission. These are independent 
and essentially technical bodies which prepare the ground for political 
debate and negotiation in the domain of inter-state financial transfers. 
They make the necessary analytical studies, and recommendations, while 
the governmental structure retains the powers of decision. In the 
Community there might be created a body which would, from outside the 
political institutions, but with links to them, evaluate regularly the 
economic caBe for Community financial intervention across the range of 
inter-governmental financial instruments. -73-
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